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PRECOMMITMENT POLITICS
Saul Levmore*
INTRODUCTION

AN

old and familiar debate sets a characterization of
democratically elected representatives as the agents of their
1
constituents against a view of politicians as autonomous actors
who are inhibited only by periodic reviews reserved to the
electorate. The latter view is associated with Edmund Burke,
who championed the "trusteeship" notion, under which a
representative ought to do what he or she thinks best in pursuit
of constituents' welfare.' The contrasting position, that a
representative is an intermediary, bound by "mandates" from
constituents, suffers from some logistical problems but is easier
to reconcile with notions of popular sovereignty. In short, there
is a question as to whether representatives ought to be viewed
as autonomous or automatons.2
*Brokaw Professor of Corporate Law and Albert Clark Tate, Jr. Professor of Law,
University of Virginia. I am grateful for suggestions received from Michael Dooley,
Scott Garvey, Clay Gillette, Jack Goldsmith, John Harrison, Michael Klarman, Cara
Maggioni, Julie Roin, Robert Scott, and at faculty workshops at Georgetown and the
University of Virginia law schools.
1 See, e.g., Edmund Burke, To the Electors of Bristol, in 1 The Works of the Right
Hon. Edmund Burke 178-80 (1837).
2 See Hanna F. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 144-67 (1967) (reviewing
arguments on both sides of the "mandate-independence controversy" in a
philosophical context); see also Daniel H. Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the
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A related question is whether most citizens would prefer that
their representatives promise to serve as thoughtful trustees or
as pure intermediaries-and whether the Constitution insists on
one of these visions. 3 To the extent that incumbents are more
like automatons as election day approaches, then there is at least
some evidence that representatives think that voters prefer the
mandate model of representation. 4 There is, moreover, the

positive question of whether aspiring politicians could seek to
attract voters by committing to behave in the manner of antiBurkean intermediaries, entirely guided by the preferences of
voters and, in an important sense, beyond the reach of dreaded
special interests. Put differently, in an era in which many voters
Intermediate Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L. Rev. 784, 831-37 (1985) (analyzing the
implications of the trusteeship and mandate theories of representation for the concept
of corruption in bribery law). Among other views, a modern, pessimistic, and positive
account depicts representatives as self-interested players who may be fueled by
organized groups. In this account, representatives can be autonomous, in the sense
that they are hardly mechanical arms of their legally assigned constituents, but
automatons insofar as their other "employers" (for example, interest groups) are
concerned. For a review of this hybrid account, see Daniel A. Farber & Philip P.
Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction 12-37, 42-47 (1991).
3 Note that there is unlikely to be unanimous agreement among constituents whether
to ask even the most conscientious legislator to serve as a mechanical or as a
thoughtful agent. On the tension between politics and constitutional law, see generally
Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27
Stan. L. Rev. 585 (1975) (arguing for a legislative duty to examine the constitutionality
of proposed legislation, and to vote against proposals that appear unconstitutional).
The precommitment strategies developed presently could be modified to include such
conscientious behavior. Thus, the precommitting legislator could ask for an "opinion
letter" on constitutional questions, especially when the legislator might be more aware
(than reviewing courts) of legislative intentions. Brest suggests that the modem
legislative committee would be capable of rendering advisory opinions, id. at 588, yet
there is no reason why opinion letters could not issue from independent constitutional
lawyers who developed reputations for political evenhandedness. For the most part,
the discussion below sets aside these constitutional, moral, and strategic problems.
4 If voters experience corruption on the part of their "thoughtful trustees," however,
they may simply prefer the mandate model as second-best. In any event, where
representation is geographic, politicians might be more responsive to their constituents
than to their parties as election day approaches. See Martin Thomas, Election
Proximity and Senatorial Roll Call Voting, 29 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 96, 109-10 (1985)
(concluding that senators shift voting patterns toward the views of their probable
opponents as elections approach, making themselves relatively more attractive to
voters). Politicians might also take voter preferences more seriously in the period just
after an election. Not only might recently-sent signals be better remembered, but also
politicians would have more trouble believing or claiming that voters' preferences had
changed in response to a variety of events.
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perceive their elected representatives to be remote, and
dangerously responsive to interest group pressures, why do
aspiring politicians not seek to attract the support of voters by
precommitting to behave as instructed or as expected? 5 These
precommitments could focus on legislative votes regarding
specific issues or could extend to virtually all matters likely to
come before a representative. The normative version of this
inquiry is to design a system that drastically reduces the
influence of organized interest groups or simply reduces the
agency problem between constituents and their political
representatives.
One explanation for the failure of political candidates to take
the leap from familiar campaign promises to more serious
precommitments is that it is not easy to precommit.
Superficially, at least, constitutional law (and in other legal
systems, comparable law) inclines toward the autonomous view
of elected representatives. 6 Legally enforceable contractual
commitments may seem efficient and fair in other contexts, but
where political representation is concerned, law itself appears to
limit the ways in which a representative can be held accountable
for votes and other official actions. 7 A buyer of a good or
service who suffers from his seller's broken promises can
normally do something more than simply decline to deal with
this seller in the future. But a voter who experiences broken
promises must generally hope that some distant election day will
offer an opportunity to join with other disappointed "customers"
in order to discipline unresponsive politicians-and signal their
5 I use the terms "precommitting" and "committing" interchangeably. The former
has alliterative advantages and hints at the idea that promisors can often be
understood as wishing to remain true to their own (earlier) selves.

6And it is pointless to ask whether a candidate could make an enforceable promise

to behave autonomously.
7 In William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an
Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & Econ. 875 (1975), there is the interesting
suggestion that an independent judiciary can be understood as a means of interpreting

"contracts," which is to say legislation, according to the intent of the enacting rather
than the current Congress. Id. at 885. One problem with this optimistic view is that

judges might be rewarded by current, but not by enacting, legislatures. In any event,
the present Article can be seen as following Landes & Posner's line of thinking, but

asking not simply how legislative deals are currently enforced but also how more
convincing (and flexible) precommitments might be undertaken.
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replacements and other agents-regarding broken promises. As
such, it may be in the interest of some aspiring politicians to
attract support by offering superior remedies in the manner of
contract law.
Part I explores a variety of such precommitment tactics as well
as the legal limits on these strategies. I suggest the possibility of
"precommitment politics," by which I mean the fashioning of
The most interesting
enforceable political promises.
precommitments-and perhaps the most palatable-may be
flexible and general, such as a promise to cast votes in a
legislative assembly as do a majority of the members of a
specified political party or as a majority of contemporaneous
constituents would prefer. Alternatively, candidates for political
office might make specific, limited commitments as to how they
will vote on, or otherwise decide, particular issues. These
specific, or substantive, precommitments may do little to allay
anxieties about the influence of most interest groups, but they
may, at the very least, respond to constituents' concerns that
their representatives will simply be self-serving rather than loyal
agents.8 I suggest that there is something of a positive puzzle in
the failure of aspiring politicians to explore precommitment
strategies. There may also be something of a normative
disappointment in the failure to combat interest group influences
with more ambitious precommitment politics.
Part II turns to precommitment strategies that might be used
to advance, rather than weaken, interest group politics. Subsets
of voters, states, and elected representatives might try to
promise that they will vote as a bloc in order to increase their
political power. These precommitments might reduce agency
costs, in the narrow sense that some voters can benefit from
these coordinated ventures, but they are likely to threaten other
voters because these arrangements aim to empower regional,
ideological, or other political alliances. I suggest that because
the aims and effects of these precommitments may be less
consistent with democratic ideals, they may face greater legal
obstacles than, for example, would precommitments by
8 See Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131, 113233 (1991) (characterizing the Bill of Rights as a structural means of controlling the
agency costs inherent in a republican form of government).
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representatives to be instructed by constituent preferences or to
abide by specific promises relied upon by voters.
A contemporary window on these ideas about precommitment
politics is the "Contract with America," signed by a large
number of Republican Party candidates prior to the 1994 U.S.
Congressional elections. Although there is some evidence that
this unenforceable "Contract" played but a small role in the
electoral success of many of these candidates, the coincidence of
the Contract and Republican successes in the election may
encourage other attempts at substantive or bloc precommitment
in the future. 9 Indeed, if there is a puzzle about the absence of
experiments with, or tests on the legal limits of, precommitment
politics, then it may be that this puzzle is an historical one, for
the perceived success of the Contract with America may herald
an age of precommitment politics.
I. PRECOMMITMENTS BY INDIVIDUAL CANDIDATES
A. The Utility of Enforceable Political Contracts
Successful political precommitments will often come in two
parts. A candidate might attract voters by promising to follow
a particular course of action if elected. But an enforcement
mechanism is required to attract skeptical voters who might find
the substantive promise appealing, but who have experienced
broken promises in the past. The complementary character of
9On the impact of the "Contract with America" on the 1994 Congressional elections,
see Everett C. Ladd, The 1994 Congressional Elections: The Postindustrial
Realignment Continues, 110 Pol. Sci. Q. 1, 10 (1995) (indicating that most voters had
little if any specific knowledge of "Contract" proposals, but that the idea of the
Contract may have reinforced sentiments that the GOP was serious about challenging
efficacy of governmental action). Another example of a movement to reduce agency
costs was Ross Perot's concept of the electronic town hall. See David Schuman, The
Origin of State Constitutional Direct Democracy: William Simon U'Ren and "The
Oregon System," 67 Temp. L. Rev. 947, 947 (1994) (suggesting that the popularity of
Perot's idea was based in its potential to make representatives more automaton-like).
Of course, it goes almost without saying that a town hall, electronic or otherwise, may
be undesirable because it may simply be captured by those who have a comparative
advantage in that sort of forum. See generally Dan Nimmo, The Electronic Town
Hall in Campaign '92: Interactive Forum or Carnival of Buncombe?, in The 1992
Presidential Campaign 207 (Robert E. Denton, Jr. ed., 1994) (summarizing how some
candidates were helped and others hurt by the emergence of the electronic town hall
during the 1992 presidential campaign).
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substantive promises and enforcement mechanisms is familiar in
contract law. Much as many consumers prefer formal contracts
in their commercial dealings, we might imagine that some voters
would be attracted to a candidate who must pay damages, or at
least suffer some tangible loss, upon breaking a serious campaign
promise. And much as many sellers benefit from contract law,
because the value of their warranties and other promises is
greater when there is enforcement, many aspiring politicians can
be expected to prefer a world in which their promises are valued
because there are serious consequences to breach. In both
commercial and political settings, the promisee recognizes that
there is some chance the promisor will breach, and indeed may
do so opportunistically. The original promise may have been an
empty one, the promisor may come to believe that the
assumptions underlying the original bargain have materially
changed, or the promisor may develop new preferences. In turn,
the promisor may calculate that there is gain to be had from
reducing the promisee's risk. Indeed, politicians may have more
to gain from legal enforcement than do other sellers of services;
most disappointed customers can penalize their sellers by taking
their business elsewhere, but a voter can only impose
comparable costs when joined by a large number of other voters.
Sellers of political services, like sellers of other goods and
services, might sometimes wish to send signals in the form of
unenforceable promises, but in both settings there will be
occasions when binding promises are valuable.
In both
commercial and political contexts, parties may benefit from the
presence of legal remedies alongside the more obvious tools of
exit and voice. 10
Among the most valuable substantive promises a candidate
could make to attract voters would be those that suggested or
even guaranteed detachment from organized interest groups.
Other promises may solve agency problems that have nothing to
do with interest groups; a candidate may, for instance, wish to
make an enforceable promise" to vote for a reduction in
10See discussion infra Part I.C.1.
111 might say "binding" promise, for it may be that a candidate will gain most from
committing in a way that is truly binding, but I use the term "enforceable" to
emphasize the connection to contract law, where breaches are often welcome at a
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legislators' salaries. More generally, if many politicians have
regarded promises as a free currency with which to attract votes,
the value of campaign promises may have fallen so far that
many candidates will come to see enforceable precommitments
as a useful means of increasing the vote-getting value of their
promises.
The simplest promises suggest simple enforcement
mechanisms. Thus, a candidate might focus on voters' concerns
about interest groups and their maligned lobbyists by promising
never to speak with one or by taxing contacts between lobbyists
and (precommitting) legislators. We might even imagine a silly
and unsubtle law, or an internal congressional rule, forbidding
members of the U.S. Congress (or members who opt into such
a rule) from meeting with "lobbyists,"' 2 or taxing contacts
between lobbyists and (precommitting) legislators.
But serious legal and political impediments doom such simple
enforcement strategies. As a political matter, voters might not
believe that Congress would follow through on its promise to
enforce these "contracts."' 3 And as a legal matter, even if such
unrefined constraints were politically successful in attracting
voters, the direct limits on contact would likely offend either the
First Amendment's right of the people "to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances" or even a broader
freedom of speech. It is hard to imagine courts' requiring
legislators to hold office hours, in a manner of speaking, but it
is easy to imagine these courts' making unenforceable legislative
(and other) commitments to bar access to citizens. 14 More
price. The trick in both contracts and politics is to use an enforcement strategy that
discourages opportunistic breaches.
12 Among the problems with this statute is the difficulty in defining "lobbyists." But
because the example in the text is illustrative, and a more serious precommitment

strategy is.offered presently, I will not dwell on such problems.

13 See discussion infra Part I.C.2 (noting the problem of Congress revisiting and
destroying earlier precommitment mechanisms). As it is, Congress does not get high
marks for self-discipline. See, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, That the Laws Shall Bind Equally
on All: Congressional and Executive Roles in Applying Laws to Congress, 48 Ark. L.

Rev. 105, 129 (1995) (indicating that the infrequency of congressional disciplinary
action suggests that the process is too lenient).
14 Nor can legislators tax interactions with interested groups or simply isolate
themselves from petitioners. A tax on every contact with interested parties would
probably be regressive and might simply offend the very voters it is meant to attract.

In contrast, a tax applied only to organized groups has some redeeming qualities.
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generally, given the Supreme Court's disinclination to permit
direct controls on organized interest groups, such as limits on
their contributions to political campaigns, 15 it is plain that the
From a rent-seeking perspective, it is plausible that such charges would extract some
of the resources that interest groups and elected officials would otherwise turn into
deadweight losses. But a discriminatory tax of this kind simply aggravates the
constitutional problems. It might be seen as impermissibly regulating the content of
speech, inasmuch as a lobbyist or citizen could presumably speak with a legislator in
the ordinary course of events, but would then be taxed when the conversation turned
to political matters (that were, perhaps, not "grievances"). Moreover, there is the
objection to discrimination against political "associations." See infra note 15.
Finally, access charges might be recharacterized as bribes or illegal gratuities. See,
e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994) (bribery statute); 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1994) (illegal
gratuities); 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994) (Hobbs Act); 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1994) (Travel Act).
Arguably, the bribery problem is avoided by the claim that a mere audience with a
political representative does not provide the necessary quid pro quo. Compare
McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 273-74 (1991) (holding quid pro quo
necessary for a campaign contribution to constitute extortion prohibited by the Hobbs
Act) with Evans v. United States, 505 U.S. 255, 267-68 (1992) (holding that the
McCormick quid pro quo requirement was satisfied in an extortion case so that no
active inducement was required on the part of the public official for an extortion
prosecution). Nevertheless, the illegal gratuity problem surely remains. See United
States v. Bustamante, 45 F.3d 933, 940 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 473 (1995)
(holding that quid pro quo is not required for conviction under illegal gratuity statute);
United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (same).
As for isolating itself from petitioners, Congress can surely regulate the hours during
which the Capitol is accessible to citizens (and lobbyists). It might limit access to the
Capitol for security reasons, and it might even limit access in order to allow members
to get their work done, but that is because these measures could survive the sort of
"strict scrutiny" that would be applied to restrictions on petitions for the redress of
grievances. Measures aimed at interest groups are likely to be doomed. See
discussion infra note 15 and accompanying text.
Is The Court has expressed its distaste for discriminatory efforts to curtail campaign
contributions by organized political interest groups:
There are, of course, some activities, legal if engaged in by one, yet illegal if
performed in concert with others, but political expression is not one of them.
To place a Spartan limit-or indeed any limit-on individuals wishing to band
together to advance their views on a ballot measure, while placing none on
individuals acting alone, is clearly a restraint on the right of association.
Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 296 (1981) (striking
down a local ordinance which limited to $250 contributions to committees formed to
support or oppose ballot measures without any similar limit on personal expenditures).
See also FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (holding Federal
Election Campaign Act provision prohibiting corporate expenditures on political
campaigns an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment as applied to nonprofit public interest corporation). But see Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (holding that a Michigan law prohibiting corporations
from using general treasury funds for political purposes survived strict scrutiny because
it was narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest in preventing political
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most direct precommitments aimed at disadvantaging organized
interest groups are also likely to be unenforceable.
But what of the candidate who promises "no new taxes" or
"universal health care" or some other, specific course of action?
Such specific, substantive precommitments can be seen as
responding either to concerns that the representative will be lazy
or selfish 16 or, more interesting, to fears that organized interests
will prevail and that the representative will be corrupted or will
genuinely come to hold views (as the result of an unhealthy mix
of information) that this representative would not have
accommodated before holding office. In a world in which
elected representatives are known to do things contrary to the
apparent preferences of their legal constituents, enforceable
precommitments could be most useful in appealing to voters. 17
B. Substantive Promises
Inasmuch as many campaign promises are about specific
issues, with the candidate promising to oppose various taxes or
to work for or against specific government projects and
regulatory schemes, it is easy to imagine candidates' attempting
to increase the vote-getting value of their promises by marketing
them as enforceable. A candidate who developed a method of
enforceable or even binding precommitments might also be
expected to emphasize the unenforceable character of an
opponent's promises. One set of problems with precommitments
regarding specific issues, backed perhaps by promises of contract
damages or legislative sanctions in the event of breach, is that
courts may be disinclined to enforce promises that contradict
norms of deliberation and flexibility.
There is a
tradition-though hardly constitutional in quality-of requiring
members of Congress, and most deliberative assemblies, to be
present in order to cast votes. 8 And there is a constitutional
corruption).
16 In the obvious case, raising taxes to finance salary increases.
17 When voters observe their legislators' enthusiasm for such things as taxes used to
subsidize industries located far from their homes, and the maintenance of intellectual
property and health care systems which generate pharmaceutical prices many times
higher than those found in other countries, their cynical outlooks cannot be surprising.
18See, e.g., H.R. Doc. No. 102-405, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 350-53 (1993) (House rule
providing that members cannot vote by proxy and cannot authorize other members
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law legacy opposed to binding instructions for legislators. 19 Both
of these norms might cause courts to be intolerant of
precommitments regarding specific issues. I will turn presently
to arguments that might encourage courts to overlook these
problems, but it is useful first to sketch other styles of
precommitment that aspiring politicians might try-and that
courts might find more acceptable.
The flexibility problem alone might be alleviated if the
precommitting candidate reserved the option to change course
in the event that other politicians or constituents come to prefer
a new path. Thus, a promisor might pledge to vote precisely as
some well-known politician votes, or as a group of leaders vote;
party discipline could in this manner come not from the party
but from aspiring candidates. 20 But a precommitter who is eager
to attract cynical voters will prefer the idea of promising fealty
to constituents.
This promisor might remain flexible by
committing, for example, to oppose all new taxes unless a
careful survey of constituents reveals that they too have come to
favor a new tax. In turn, voters might be expected to be
especially attracted by promises that are enforceable against the
promisor but forgivable by the promisees. 21 This escape valve,
in the form of consultation with one's constituents, neither
permits total flexibility nor credits legislative deliberation, but it
does suggest the possibility of folding some flexibility into a
contractual solution to political agency problems.
The ultimate combination of flexibility and contractual control
might be found in a promise by an aspiring representative to
follow the anti-Burkean ideal, voting always as instructed by
surveys of constituents back home.22 Of course, in the best of all
to vote for them); Henry M. Robert, Robert's Rules of Order Newly Revised § 44 at
355, 360 (1970) (stating the default rule against absentee voting in deliberative
assemblies).

19See infra note 54 and accompanying text. I do not think that the notion of
legislatures instructing their representatives would have been more acceptable if these
instructions were not binding but were instead to be followed upon pain of damages.
20 One drawback to this sort of promise is that the candidate would be unable to
promise (or eventually unable to deliver) benefits tailored to his or her district.
21 The forgiveness is not precisely the same as that which may be found in contract

law because not all those who relied on the political promise will agree to forgive it.
22

Itis interesting to note that in 1783 there was a proposal for "'assembling parishes
separately.' before deciding "'in General Assembly on a certain majority of vouched
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worlds most voters would probably prefer a representative with
some intelligence, a capacity to contribute to legislative debates,
and the ability to form coalitions with other legislators. But in
a world where organized interest groups appear to wield great
power, where politicians can easily turn into unfaithful agents,
and where individual voters understand firsthand the collective

action problem facing dispersed citizens, it is plausible that
voters would prefer a representative who could only remain true

to median voters.

Such a representative could be beyond

capture by interest groups and even incapable of self-serving

votes. 23

and recorded parochial decisions."' Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American
Republic 194 (1969). This proposal can be seen as the forebear of the flexible
precommitment strategy described in the text. The idea of using a survey group can
also be found in Robert A. Dahl, After the Revolution?: Authority in a Good Society
149-50 (1970) (proposing randomly selected advisory groups for each public official)
and in James S. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic
Reform 81-104 (1991) (describing deliberative opinion polls and citing England's
experimental television program, Granada 500, and the original structure of the
electoral college as vehicles through which citizens might participate in the political
dialogue). One novel aspect of the text's suggestion is that each council would be
chosen to reflect the constituents of a given representative because the representative
offers to follow the group's instructions in order to be elected. These groups are not
forced on anyone by a government or by a political scientist but are instead seen as
serving the private interests of their initiators, who seek to enter into enforceable
contracts in order to be elected.
As for the survey idea in the text, note that while a candidate will attract more
voters if the survey group is chosen to represent likely voters or even some carefully
chosen majority of these voters (drawn perhaps from one political party), judicial
tolerance is likely to require the survey group to reflect or represent all voters or all
citizens. See Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 58 (1982) (protecting a candidate who
promised briefly-in violation of a state statute-to serve for a reduced salary and
noting that "[n]ot only was the source of the promised benefit the public fisc, but that
benefit was to extend beyond those voters who cast their ballots for Brown, to all
taxpayers and citizens"). Thus, even voters who are aligned with a preferred party or
a narrowly-drawn survey group will regard the promise of obedience to theirgroup as
mere campaign rhetoric.
23In the extreme, a representative might take instructions on all committee votes and
the like and be relegated to a career as an automaton. The more voters prefer to
weaken interest groups, and the more they are concerned about a variety of agency
costs, the more they might be inclined toward the automaton or mandate model-and
the more a candidate can appeal to these preferences by precommitting to follow
instructions. Much as there is no single contract that will provide the right level of
independence and fidelity for all principal-agent relations, so too there is no reason
to think that any single style of precommitment politics is best. One can imagine
precommitments limited to subject areas, and one can imagine politicians who gain the
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There are, of course, a number of normative and political
problems with this promise. Voters (and normatively-minded
readers and courts) might think that some decisionmaking
requires expertise or investment in information, and individual
constituents whose preferences are reflected in surveys will have
had little incentive to invest optimally in acquiring information.
A second problem is that surveys may be corrupt or inaccurate.
A third problem is that surveys do not normally or easily
measure the intensity of preferences. A slim majority of
constituents may prefer one course of legislative action while a
minority may strongly prefer another. The minority might, at
least hypothetically, be able to bargain with the majority to
proceed as the minority would like, and a variety of democratic
and utilitarian theories might suggest that the most faithful
course of action for an agent of all these constituents would be
to vote as this minority would like. A fourth problem with the
idea of representation-by-survey is that a representative can
normally benefit his or her constituents by joining forces, or
logrolling, with other representatives; 24 a legislator who is bound
by surveys of constituents will surely miss some opportunities for
these subtle and perhaps even secretive deals. If voters believe
these problems to be serious, they will regard the prospect of
representation-by-survey as something to be avoided rather than
embraced. In turn, precommitment politics will be unattractive
to aspiring politicians.
Most of these problems can be resolved, although we might
expect candidates to explore diverse strategies in appealing to
voters. One approach is to combine the survey strategy
associated with television ratings25 with the deliberative qualities
trust of their constituents and then modify their precommitments in each reelection
campaign, or even rise to the level where they are trusted to be more autonomous in
the manner of long-term agents.
24

Even if logrolling is not socially beneficial, it is surely the case that in a world

where logrolling takes place, one is at a disadvantage in unilaterally abstaining from
such transactions. On the possibility of socially beneficial logrolling, see James M.
Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent 132-34 (1962) (arguing that
logrolling permits legislators to express intensity of preferences). A well-known

refinement of the argument is that vote trading may be beneficial in individual
transactions but detrimental in the aggregate. E.g., William H. Riker & Steven J.
Brams, The Paradox of Vote Trading, 67 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1235 (1973).

25 Prices for advertising time on American television are largely tied to the Nielsen
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of juries or of the Congress itself; a candidate could promise to
abide by the instructions of a representative sample of twelve or
of one hundred constituents, whose identities would not be
publicized,26 and who would be informed regularly about
pending issues and options. This approach might provide a
representative sample of voters, while maintaining the values of

deliberation and flexibility. The fewer the participants the more
the dangers of corruption, but the more the members of the
sample group could be expected to invest in information. 27
ratings, a private, entrepreneurial survey which uses a sample of 1750
"audimeters"--electronic measuring devices placed in selected and agreeable
households-supplemented with a much larger number of household television-viewing
diaries. David A. Aaker & George S. Day, Marketing Research 732-33 (4th ed. 1990).
A variety of survey techniques are found elsewhere. See generally W. A. Twyman,
Television Media Research, in Consumer Market Research Handbook 689 (Robert M.
Worcester & John Downham eds., 3d rev. ed. 1986) (reviewing various methods used
in television media research); Wayne Friedman, Cable Nets Get SMART: Cable
Networks to Sign With the System for Measuring and Reporting Television, Inside
Media, May 24, 1995, available in Westlaw, 1995 WL 10025833, INMED database
(reporting on an alternative market research effort intended to compete with Nielsen).
There is no attempt to camouflage the identities of families included in the Nielsen
television ratings sample, and yet there appears to be no serious problem of
advertising agencies or television networks' bribing those who are surveyed. Billions
of dollars are at stake and yet the survey system appears to function fairly well.
Similarly, the intermediaries who conduct ratings seem to have integrity, or simply
more to lose from tarnishing their reputations than to gain from short-term payoffs
from agencies, program creators, or broadcasters.
2 The main purpose of guarding the identities of those surveyed is to avoid the
problem of interest groups' seeking to influence these representative constituents. The
idea is to convince voters that instructions will come from a representative survey
group (comprised of likely voters who have found it worthwhile to study the issues)
and to avoid the perception that this group is yet another organized interest or
captured organization. A reliable intermediary might be used to monitor and replace
survey group members who make their identities public or are suspected of seeking
payments. Note, however, that television ratings do not seem to require secrecy. See
supra note 25.
27 The earlier reference to juries illustrates both an example of delegated
decisionmaking with popular appeal and the problem of balancing the psychological
and factfinding advantages of a large group with the likelihood of each participant
paying less attention as the probability of casting the deciding vote drops. Concerning
the relative advantages of large-group deliberations, see Michael J. Saks, Jury
Verdicts: The Role of Group Size and Social Decision Rule 90-91 (1977) (concluding
that large juries are substantially more representative of the community than small
juries); see also Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 233 (1978) (Plurality opinion of
Blackmun, J.) (holding that five-person jury in criminal case violates the Fourteenth
Amendment and reasoning that decrease in jury size lowers the chance that a member
will remember important piece of evidence or argument). In the voting context, it
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But I make no attempt to describe the perfect precommitment
strategy, for there is reason to think that the best strategy will

vary according to the reputation and experience of particular
candidates and constituents. And however the preferences of
constituents are determined, candidates might experiment with

the scope of their precommitment to the mandate model of
representation. Some might promise to follow instructions on
specific matters, others might agree to enforceability with respect
to all issues that have been put before the survey group, and
others might even rely on an intermediary to project the likely
preferences

of

the

group

so

that

the

precommitting

representative would virtually never decide freely how to cast a
vote.

Much as manufacturers of goods follow diverse strategies

may be that as the sample increases, each member has less of an incentive to invest
in information, but if there is a deliberative component then there may be more
information in a larger group.
Note also that each member of a small group faces some reasonable chance of
casting a critical vote-and may therefore be more likely to invest in information.
Even the Senate and House occasionally decide things by a single vote, so that each
member of a hundred-person survey group will know that his or her vote could (with
similar likelihood) be the decisive vote in instructing the representative, whose vote
could then be decisive in the Congress. See generally Geoffrey Brennan & James
Buchanan, Voter Choice, 28 Am. Behavioral Scientist 185 (1984) (arguing that voters
know of negligible value of their votes in general elections); Jean-Pierre Benoit &
Lewis A. Kornhauser, Social Choice in a Representative Democracy, 88 Am. Pol. Sci.
Rev. 185 (1994) (noting that voters in a representative democracy are removed from
policymaking because at best they vote for legislators who then vote on policies).
Finally, there is also some opportunity to influence fellow members of the survey
group through electronic mail or whatever means might be used (if desired) to permit
communication prior to polling.
28 One problem that is unique to a political survey which gives time for study and
deliberation is that there will be occasions when the survey group has not been
informed and polled about an issue that needs to be decided. Even a well-informed
survey group cannot possibly anticipate all amendments made on the floor of a
legislative assembly and other legislative surprises, and we might anticipate that the
precommitted representative will often be uninstructed. Constituents are unlikely to
gravitate toward a candidate who promises to abstain from voting in these situations.
At the same time, there is the danger that organized interests will capture a
representative who will then arrange for procedural zigs and zags in order to maximize
the number of important votes for which no instructions have been given. The
precommitting representative, in these situations, might promise to abide by the
instructions of an intermediary who is asked to interpret recent survey data in order
to advise the representative on how a majority (or supermajority) of the group would
likely have voted. In any event, the point is not to design a pure mandate scheme but
rather to insulate representatives from interest groups and to promise sufficient
responsiveness to constituents so as to gain their trust.
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as to warranties, quality, and so forth, we should not expect a
single, best strategy to emerge in the design of political
promises.
C. PromisingEnforcement
1. Contract
I have suggested that a candidate for political office might
appeal to voters by offering to make the task of representation
as mechanical as constituents would like. There remains the
problem of convincing a skeptical electorate that the
precommitment promise will not be breached. The timehonored method of "enforcing" campaign promises is to turn a
promise-breaker out of office at the next election. Insurgents
can be expected to focus attention on incumbents' broken
promises. Nevertheless, it is likely that most voters devalue
campaign promises and regard them as but weak signals. And
even if voters turned every promise-breaker out of office, there
remains the problem of candidates' breaking promises when they
have decided not to stand for reelection and the more general
problem of candidates' voting as certain interest groups like on
issues that had not crystallized during past election campaigns. 29
Most contracting parties do not, of course, react to, breaches
by triggering the legal remedies to which they are entitled.
Many disappointed buyers, to take the plainest example, elect
not to patronize a vendor who has been unreliable or even
opportunistic. Nevertheless, buyers are empowered by the
additional remedies offered by the law of contracts. Repeat
business and reputation considerations do not appear to be
enough to promote efficient breach. Other remedies, such as
expectancy damages (not to mention restitution and specific
performance), may be relatively rarely deployed, but these other
legal tools play useful roles as they shadow promisors.
Correspondingly, there is little reason to think that where
political promises are concerned, deterrents associated with
repeat play should suffice. Contract theorists must believe that
29 Even cooperating voters might find it difficult to decide on the optimal rate of
removing promise-breakers from office. The successor representative may also break
promises-and the successor will have less seniority.
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in the absence of contract law parties would try to precommit to
performance and to promise-keeping. Contract law is thought
to offer default rules which save parties from the expense of
either designing their own precommitment devices or giving up
the gains from trade. It is thus puzzling why politicians do not
develop comparable precommitment devices. And there may be
something of a puzzle if the law discourages rather than enables
voluntary robust precommitments.
Much as contracting parties might prefer a world in which
their breaches could be remedied by law, political candidates
and constituents might try to enlist courts or political parties or,
ex ante, Congress itself as an enforcer of political promises.
Imagine first that a candidate simply promised to pay a specified
sum of money to named parties for each violation of a political
promise, but then breached and refused to pay.30 If the promise
is unenforceable, then political precommitments of the kind
sketched here will not impress voters-and aspiring politicians
may also be worse off. But an enforceable promise may be
quite effective in garnering votes, so that a candidate would wish
for many promises to be enforceable.
One barrier to such serious political promises is that while the
standard legal remedies for breach of contract require (at least
the threat of) judicial intervention, there is a constitutional, if
doctrinal, problem with this enforcement mechanism. Under the
30 The doctrinal requirement of consideration might be met by these parties' agreeing
to read the candidate's platform papers in return for the candidate's agreeing to vote
as instructed by the survey group. The same strategy might solve any problem relating
to standing doctrine, although a claim for contract damages runs the risk of a court's
ruling that the liquidated damages are excessive and unenforceable. The standing
problem, if it is that, is that one who is simply disappointed by a politician might not
be thought to have achieved the status normally required of a litigant. Of course, if
Congress wished to create a cause of action in order to facilitate precommitment
politics, it could easily do so. Finally, there is something of a causation problem,
unless there is a single promise-breaker and the congressional decision was made by
a one vote margin. The disappointed promisee may need to argue that other
coalitions may have formed, that other promises would be made if all were enforced,
and so forth. The easiest solution, as anticipated in the text, is a liquidated damages
clause. This itself can be something of a small enforcement hurdle. See generally
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just
Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of
Efficient Breach, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 554 (1977) (questioning the wisdom of traditional
limitations on enforcing liquidated damages clauses).
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Speech or Debate Clause, a member of Congress is not to be
"questioned in any other place" for any speech or debate, and
a suit by a promisee for money damages would on its face be a
call for the promisor-representative to answer questions in
another place, which is to say in a court rather than in the
legislative chamber. 31 The problem could be avoided with a
literal reading of the text, because the contract claim will often

be about a vote and not about a speech or debate.32 And it
might also be avoided with an historical argument that the

clause was probably intended to protect against attempts by the
executive branch to control the legislature.33 The President, it

31 The full language of the clause is: "[A]nd for any Speech or Debate in either
House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place." U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
This clause has been broadly interpreted to shield legislators from both civil and
criminal liability. See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 311-18 (1973) (civil liability);
United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 177-85 (1966) (criminal liability). It has,
however, been limited to "legislative" as opposed to "political" activities, so that it
does not shield a legislator from bribery laws. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501,
512 (1972).
Note that the clause forms a similar hurdle for legislators (or constituents or
Presidents) who attempt to make logrolling agreements enforceable. In a world with
no line-item veto, a contract to trade support for different measures may be
accomplished by combining the measures in one bill. But I leave discussion of
political precommitments of this kind for another day.
32 But see Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 624 (1972) (noting that prior cases
have read the Speech or Debate Clause broadly and that voting by members is
protected).
33 The Speech or Debate Clause grew out of English Parliamentary immunity where
speech and debate were considered vital to Parliamentary sovereignty. See Johnson,
383 U.S. at 177-78 (characterizing the speech or debate clause of the English Bill of
Rights of 1689, the ancestor of the American Speech or Debate Clause, as the product
of an ongoing effort by the monarchy to suppress and intimidate Parliament); see also
Amar, supra note 8, at 1151 ("the very notion of free speech for citizens had grown
out of an older tradition establishing legislative 'speech and debate' immunity from
prosecution."). In turn, the clause is seen as a means of protecting the separation of
powers. Steven N. Sherr, Note, Freedom and Federalism: The First Amendment's
Protection of Legislative Voting, 101 Yale LJ. 233, 235-36 (1991); see also Brewster,
408 U.S. at 507 ("The immunities of the Speech or Debate Clause were not written
into the Constitution simply for the personal or private benefit of Members of
Congress, but to protect the integrity of the legislative process by insuring the
independence of individual legislators."); Johnson, 383 U.S. at 178-79 (observing that
the Speech or Debate Clause reinforces constitutional separation of powers). At the
same time, the modern conception of the reach of the clause plainly exceeds the scope
of the historical understanding. See, e.g., Gravel,408 U.S. at 609, 624-26 (holding that
Senator and aide were protected when the Senator read classified documents-the
Pentagon Papers-into the public record at a subcommittee meeting, but that an
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should be noted, while not protected by the Speech or Debate
Clause in Article I, would have trouble precommitting through
contract because there are other sources of immunity which
would make presidential precommitments unconvincing. 34
2. CongressionalEnforcement
An alternative which avoids the Speech or Debate Clause is

for Congress to precommit to penalize (on its own) promisebreaking by members who had opted in to this form of
precommitment politics. A chamber could, for example, take
away a breacher's staff, office, or committee membership. 35 The
agreement to publish the document privately would not be protected).
3 See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982) (holding that "petitioner, as a
former President of the United States, is entitled to absolute immunity from damages
liability predicated on his official acts"). It should be noted, however, that in the
Nixon case Congress had made no attempt to pass a law specifically making the
President liable for civil damages.
There is also the question of whether political appointees could precommit in the
fashion suggested in the text. One can imagine, for example, a president's agreeing
to appoint someone to the bench (or a Senate's agreeing to confirm a judicial
nomination) in return for a promise by that nominee to vote a certain way on specific
matters or to be bound by later instructions. I have little doubt but that other federal
courts would find such promises unenforceable. Conceptually, this precommitment
seems inconsistent with an independent judiciary; technically, the deal might be
regarded as a corrupt kickback. See 18 U.S.C. § 210 (1994) (criminalizing offers to
procure appointive office). At its core, then, the argument in the text is based on the
assumption that the anti-Burkean ideal does not offend the Constitution as other
things might. I return to this point below.
35 A more straightforward plan would be for each chamber to waive its Speech or
Debate Clause immunity, or to allow members to waive immunity for specific causes
of action. The Supreme Court has specifically declined to rule on this question,
although it has implied that the Clause is for individual members rather than for the
institution as a whole. See United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 490-93 (1979).
The penalties suggested in the text are minor because the power of each legislative
chamber to "punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence
of two thirds, expel a Member," U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 2, is subject to the
constraint that courts not find that these internal rules and remedies are themselves
unconstitutional. See, e.g., United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892) (holding that
rules may not ignore constitutional restraints nor violate fundamental rights and
requiring a "reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained"); United States
v. Richmond, 550 F. Supp. 605, 609 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (voiding Congressman's plea
bargain to resign and not run for reelection as bartering "away constitutional
protections which belong not to him but to his constituents"). It is possible, however,
that courts would be tolerant of such internal remedies when applied in favor of
implementing the wishes of constituents.
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Speech or Debate Clause may constrain judicial enforcement,
but by its very reference to accountability in "any other place"
it implies that members can be held accountable within the
Congress.
One problem with this internal enforcement strategy is that
voters may expect Congress to prove unreliable as an enforcer
of its members' promises. A breach is likely to occur when a
precommitting representative is induced to join a prevailing
coalition. But that coalition is likely to forgive its member's
breach of an earlier promise inasmuch as the very point of the
breach was to join this majority in passing a new program or tax,
for example.
3. Third-Party Enforcement and Self-Enforcing Bonds
Perhaps the most intriguing enforcement strategy is to use
carrots rather than sticks. Public-spirited entities 36 could raise
money and promise to reward politicians who abided by their
precommitments, although there is the question of whether these

secondary promisors can themselves make enforceable
promises. 37 But even fairly cynical constituents might think that
Finally, Congress could reward members who abided by their promises. But this sort
of internal promise will not satisfy voters who might expect Congress to prove
unreliable when a majority finds itself in the position of being obliged to reward a
minority. The discussion in the text does turn presently to the use of carrots (for
promise-keepers) rather than sticks (for promise-breakers).
36A danger of including government entities, such as states, in this category is that
their presence might raise the objection that another source of power was competing
with the national legislature. See infra note 57 and accompanying text. Note also that
the entities may be self-serving rather than public-regarding because they may simply
like the status quo enough to favor innovations that make future legislation more
difficult.
37The question is whether a potential donor can agree to make contributions if a
candidate performs in a certain manner, and whether such an agreement is enforceable
if the donor later decides not to make these payments. The discussion in the text has
explored the first of these questions. The donor's own (secondary) promise might be
enforced because a disappointed contributor to the donor-intermediary could claim a
reliance or similar interest. Thus, if an organization raised money which it had agreed
to divide among promise-keeping precommitters, then contributors to that
organization's "promise-keeping fund" might be able to force the disbursement of
these funds. Cf. Portland Section of the Council of Jewish Women v. Sisters of
Charity, 513 P.2d 1183 (Or. 1973) (granting specific performance with respect to an
endowed hospital bed). These contributors might be more attractive plaintiffs than
disappointed politicians because the latter group might appear to be asking for
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an established entity, with a reputation for bipartisan or

politically-neutral activities, will keep its promise to reward those
who keep their promises. 38 These ex post subsidies to promisekeeping politicians, however, can easily run into bribery statutes,
prohibitions on receiving illegal gratuities, or other federal ethics
laws. 39 There is an excellent theoretical case to be made for the
idea that payments made to reward and encourage a politician

who follows the independently monitored preferences of
voters-as opposed to the preferences of donors-are and ought
to be completely distinguishable from those payments addressed

and forbidden by these criminal statutes.n0 Nevertheless, the
language and enforcement history of these statutes pose serious
difficulties for precommitment politics. At the very least,
payments made directly to promise-keeping representatives
payments in return for performing their official functions.
38 One can easily imagine a third-party movement supporting one of the major-party
candidates, but withholding substantial contributions with a promise to pay over these
funds if and when a series of specified promises or future survey results are followed.
39 See supra note 14; see also 5 U.S.C. § 7353 (1994) (Gift Statute). Although the
Supreme Court has suggested that it will narrowly interpret federal ethics laws, see,
e.g., Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990) (strictly construing the
prohibition against supplemental compensation for government service and holding
that an unconditional severance payment made to Boeing employees leaving the
company to enter federal service was not illegal), the scheme described in the text
seems too direct a violation of the limitation on outside earned income to be tolerated.
It is easy to overstate the relevance of these statutes to the questions raised by the
idea of precommitment politics. These statutes are relatively modern, after all, yet
precommitments of the kind suggested in this Article are essentially unknown.
40 Even when a politician serves the interests of a subset of constituents, there is a
recognized distinction between legitimate political behavior and graft:
Serving constituents and supporting legislation that will benefit the district and
individuals and groups therein is the everyday business of a legislator ....
Whatever ethical considerations and appearances may indicate, to hold that
legislators commit the federal crime of extortion when they act for the benefit
of constituents or support legislation furthering the interests of some of their
constituents, shortly before or after campaign contributions are solicited and
received from those beneficiaries, is an unrealistic assessment of what Congress
could have meant by making it a crime to obtain property from another ....
McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 272 (1991).
Another feature of precommitment schemes that suggests judicial tolerance or
support is that the promise is publicly known, whereas corruption is associated with
secrecy. See Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 56-57 (1982) (associating openness of
candidate's promise to return official salary with disinclination to allow the election
of that candidate to be voided simply because the promise was found to violate state
law).
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would quickly run afoul of the legislated limits on supplemental
income. 41
An obvious means of avoiding the last set of problems is to
structure ex post payments to promise-keepers as campaign
contributions. As a practical matter, contributions that meet the
requirements of the campaign finance statutes are treated as
immune from attack under the bribery and illegal gratuity
statutes.42 Donors or reliable intermediaries could promise to
41See 5 U.S.C. app. § 501 (1994) (limiting outside income to 15% of salary). In
United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995), the
Court held that this limitation amounted to an undue interference with the First
Amendment rights of some government employees, id. at 1012-15, but it implied that
limitations on Members of Congress were acceptable. See id. at 1014. In any event,
a central theme in this area of law appears to be that the closer the relationship
between the outside payment and the nature of the official's public duties, the more
likely the outside payment constitutes a violation of the ethics laws. And inasmuch
as the purpose of the precommitment plan is to establish a nexus between a
legislator's public service (or voting record) and the outside payment, a
precommitment plan would have a difficult day in court. The difference between a
precommitment payment and more traditional ethics violations is of course that the
former is open, rather than secret, and it is arguably consistent with, rather than
destructive of, democratic principles.
Congress could of course revise these statutes, explicitly permitting such payments
for promise-keeping politicians, but it may be useful to consider alternatives in the
likely absence of such new, or interpretative, legislation. It is noteworthy, however,
that a 1983 Office of Government Ethics advisory letter stated that a non-profit
organization giving a $5,000 award for meritorious public service did not violate any
statutes or regulations. Letter from David H. Martin, Director, United States Office
of Government Ethics, O.G.E. Letter 83 x 10: Letter to a Designated Agency Ethics
Official, July 21, 1983, available in Westlaw, 1983 WL 31713 (O.G.E.) FETH-OGE
database. It is arguable that any payment made to a representative who votes
perfectly (as promised) could be regarded as just such an award.
Note that many states constrain payments to legislators in a manner similar to
federal law. A 1990 survey of 40 states found that 35 restricted the use of public
office to obtain private benefits, 34 regulated the provision of benefits to influence
official action, 33 limited gifts given to public officials, 28 regulated the receipt of
honoraria, and 27 restricted the outside employment of public officials. The District
of Columbia restricted each of the five listed categories. Four states (Idaho,
Minnesota, Utah, and Wyoming) possessed no substantive ethics laws. Data from
Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Kentucky, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, South
Dakota, Virginia, and Washington was not available. The Council of State
Governments, COGEL Blue Book: Campaign Finance, Ethics & Lobby Law 144-45
tbl. 26 (Joyce Bullock ed., 8th ed. 1990).
42 A campaign contribution is to be regarded as a bribe "only if the payments are
made in return for an explicit promise or undertaking by the official to perform or not
to perform an official act." McCormick, 500 U.S. at 273 (1991). Unfortunately, this
means that inexperienced and unlucky donors may find themselves convicted of a
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make campaign contributions to, or divide a given fund among
the campaigns of, elected officials who keep their promises.
An advantage of the third-party-subsidy strategy is that it

plays on the possibility that even if courts are disinclined to
enforce political contracts they may nevertheless be reluctant to

intervene in order to make them unenforceable. An extension
of this strategy exploits the asymmetry, or endowment effect,

likely to be found with respect to judicial intervention regarding
these (and so many other) legal rules,43 and attempts to avoid
the orbit

of anti-bribery laws

and limits on campaign

contributions as well.44 An aspiring representative could pay
himself, as it were, for promise-keeping. For example, a
candidate might convey personal funds or title to a piece of
property to an intermediary who would be instructed to return

such property only if a set of promises had been kept, and
otherwise to transfer the property to a not-specified third party.45
crime. See, e.g., People v. Brandstetter, 430 N.E.2d 731, 733 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)
(upholding bribery conviction where activist wrote a note to the candidate saying
"offer for help in your election & $1000 for your campaign for Pro ERA vote"); see
also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 28 (1976) (upholding federal campaign contribution
limits as a means of dealing with the reality or appearance of corruption and noting
that bribery laws deal with "only the most blatant and specific attempts of those with
money to influence governmental action"). At least one commentator has argued that
any campaign contribution allowed by the Federal Election Campaign Act should be
immune from bribery laws. Note, Campaign Contributions and Federal Bribery Law,
92 Harv. L. Rev. 451, 461-66 (1978). While this is plainly not the law, otherwise valid
campaign contributions do carry a strong presumption of legitimacy. In any event,
state campaign finance law is often less restrictive than federal law so that subsidies
to the reelection campaigns of promise-keeping state legislators may be useful for
precommitment state politics.
43 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (1993) (criticizing the
tendency in constitutional law to empower the status quo by distinguishing between
action and inaction, and neutrality and partisanship).
44 Some form of "bundling" of funds might overcome the statutory limit on campaign
contributions and expenditures imposed by 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1994). See Fred
Wertheimer & Susan Weiss Manes, Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to Restoring
the Health of Our Democracy, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1126, 1140-41 (1994) (describing
"bundling loophole" as a means of providing contributions in excess of statutory
limits).
45 Success may again depend on whether a court views the underlying plan as
promoting democracy or as inconsistent with constitutional principles. For example,
courts will find a way to invalidate the enforcement mechanism if the conveyance
strategy is normatively offensive. See Martin v. Francis, 191 S.W. 259, 260 (Ky. 1917)
(implying that neither party could collect a $500 bond given to a neutral party to
secure performance of an (illegal) contract under which Republican candidate for
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The precommitting politician must legally part with the bond, or
legal intervention will be required to extract it in the event of a
breach. There is, however, the danger that "repayment" to the

promise-keeping politician will still be regarded as a bribe (not
to mention as a taxable transfer 46). The advantage of the bondposting scheme is that a court (or prosecutor who contemplates
bringing a bribery claim) is less likely to view the politician as
gaining an illicit benefit than as avoiding a loss; this benefit-loss
distinction is sometimes critical, rather than silly, in the context
of these anti-corruption statutes.47 To be sure, courts have

shown little inclination to approve, or make enforceable,
promises by officials to serve for less compensation than that
jailor agreed to drop out of race and Democratic candidate agreed to appoint him
deputy, on grounds that the contract violated public policy).
Another problem with the transfer-and-expected-return strategy concerns the legal
validity of a conditional gift, if it is that, especially because the condition is here in the
control of the grantor. Compare Raim v. Stancel, 339 N.W.2d 621, 623-24 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1983) (invalidating deed where it was the subject of conditional gift over which
grantor retained control) with Turner v. Mallernee, 640 S.W.2d 517, 521-24 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1982) (enforcing unrecorded deed as having been delivered subject to the
condition that the grantor not require expensive medical treatment before his death)
and Videon v. Cowart, 241 So. 2d 434, 435-36 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (holding
conditional delivery of deed valid where condition renouncing a right to the rest of the
grantor's estate was to be performed wholly by the grantee and could not be
influenced by the grantor).
46 The intermediary should probably not be a non-profit organization, because it may
jeopardize its status by making the payment to the promise-keeper. One way to think
about the bond posted with an individual or other reliable intermediary is that there
are no tax consequences to its posting and then none to the repayment. It is
something like a refundable deposit. Another possibility is that at the time of
repayment the precommitting politician would have income to report-but then there
might be a deduction for the earlier transfer to the holder of the bond. The payments
in both directions might be made on an annual basis in order to make the deduction
most useful.
47
Thus, a candidate could be prosecuted for promising to pay $10,000 if elected, but
not for promising to forgo any and all opportunities to earn outside income while in
office. The distinction is between a private faction "buying" a politician and a
politician "buying" an office, on the one hand, and a candidate providing a benefit to
potential voters or suffering a penalty in order to attract voters on the other. In
Brown v. Hartage,it will be recalled, the Supreme Court essentially invalidated a state
law which criminalized promising voters to serve at a salary less than that officially
provided. On the other hand, it is hardly clear that voters could have forced the
successful candidate to serve at the lower salary, as promised. 456 U.S. at 57 (noting
that the precommitment could have been enforced only with the approval of public
officials).
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But this disinclination to encourage

homemade salary reductions might be linked to the notion that

jurisdictions may prefer more rather than less official
compensation in order to attract qualified rather than merely
affluent candidates, and to reduce the inclination of struggling

or resentful officials to accept illicit payments in return for

political favors. 49 In any event, the essential point is that if the

precommitment scheme is structured in a way that requires the
breacher to change his mind and then sue for a return of funds,
it is easy to imagine courts' declining to intervene on his behalf
There is, however, no direct precedent for this conjecture about
50
asymmetries in judicial sensibilities.
4
8The time-honored rule is that a politician may not be bound by an agreement to
serve for less than the prescribed salary. See, e.g., Glavey v. United States, 182 U.S.
595, 605-10 (1901) (holding that the Secretary of the Treasury could not condition an
appointment as inspector of foreign vessels on the appointee's accepting less than the
statutory salary); Sparks v. Boggs, 339 S.W.2d 480, 484 (Ky. 1960) (holding that
candidates offering to serve for $1 and spend their $500 salary on public projects
violated Kentucky's Corrupt Practices Act). But see Schwarz v. City of Philadelphia,
12 A.2d 294, 296-98 (Pa. 1940) (holding that a coroner could not recover portions of
his salary which had been deducted as part of a voluntary effort to economize
government during the Depression).
49 See Hartlage,456 U.S. at 59-60.
50 An interesting but ultimately unhelpful case is Fisher v. Lane, 149 P.2d 562 (Or.
1944), where plaintiff, a justice of the peace, sued to collect unpaid statutory fees for
his having issued writs, attachments, and other orders. Plaintiff had agreed to collect
these fees only if defendants' legal actions were successful, and defendants, who
operated a credit bureau, in return brought a good deal of "business" to plaintiff that
they would otherwise have filed elsewhere. The court allowed the plaintiff to recover
his statutory fees by voiding the (contingency) agreement as against public policy. It
is indeed easy to imagine that the contingency fee contract encouraged excessive or
even biased legal actions.
The case may be relevant (and unfriendly) to the discussion in the text to the extent
that the case illustrates the unwillingness of courts to enforce contracts regarding the
behavior of public officials. Indeed, it is arguable that the best way to discourage the
sort of entrepreneurial activity engaged in by Fisher would have been to hoist him by
his own contract, denying recovery against those who used his services. Had the court
denied the claim for the statutory fees, I might well have argued that it did so because
the underlying behavior was thought socially undesirable, but that precommitments
of the kind explored in this Article would be treated more kindly by courts.
But there are at least two reasons why the decision in Fisher v. Lane is not easily
translated to other precommitments.. First, the Oregon statute provided that each
justice of the peace make a monthly accounting and forward to the general fund of the
county all fees collected in excess of $200 per month. Id. at 566. Deterring the
misbehaving justice might therefore penalize the fisc. Second, maximum deterrence
might well be advanced by a system that not only deterred private parties from
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In short, some precommitment strategies involve courts more
than others do, but no strategy can succeed without a dash of

judicial tolerance. I turn, therefore, to the question of whether
courts might be expected to regard political precommitments as

attractive, or at least as something less than constitutionally
abhorrent.
D. Tolerating Precommitments

A cleverly designed precommitment to engage in a crime
while in political office would surely induce a court to void the
underlying contract or otherwise remove the incentive to do
wrong. I suggested earlier that a precommitment to vote against
all tax increases proposed during one's term in office might, for

example, also be intolerable. The argument in favor of such a
precommitment is that it reduces agency costs; the promisor can
not support a large class of self-serving tax policies once in office
and, if the precommitrnent is enforceable, it reduces the
potential power of many organized interests. But the argument
against this sort of precommitment is that it so completely

violates the democratic norm of deliberation as well as the
constitutional norm, if it is that, of flexibility.5 ' On the other
hand, there is room for a view that the Framers did not

entering into such contracts by making them pay but also deterred the public official
through the criminal law. We can presume that Fisher's public position (and perhaps
even his liberty or future employment opportunities) was at risk after this case.
51 The primary argument in the first Congress against adopting a right to instruct
representatives as part of the First Amendment was the requirement of deliberation,
which would be defeated by binding instructions. See generally 11 Documentary
History of the First Federal Congress of the United States of America, Debates in the
House of Representatives: First Session, June-September 1789, at 1264-82 (Charlene
Bangs Bickford, Kenneth R. Bowling & Helen E. Veit eds., 1992) (reporting debates
in the House of Representatives concerning the right of states to instruct
representatives). The debates offered early examples of the concern with flexibility.
Thomas Hartley (of Pennsylvania) asked:
And were all the members to take their seats in order to obey instructions, and
those instructions were as various as it is probable they would be, what
possibility would there exist of so accommodating each to the other, as to
produce any act whatever? Perhaps a majority of the whole might not be
instructed to agree to any one point ....
Id. at 1266. William Smith (of South Carolina) thought that a right to instruct
legislators "will operate as a partial inconvenience to the more distant states; if every
member is to be bound by instructions how to vote, what are gentlemen from the
extremities of the continent to do?" Id. at 1271.
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contemplate or anticipate the future of campaign finance, and
that a legal system constrained by the First Amendment to
forbid direct limits on interest group contributions might be
especially inclined to tolerate innovations that reduced the
power of organized interest groups. I could imagine some courts
tolerating limited, specific precommitments more readily than
broader promises to abide by surveys of (even the most
informed and deliberative) constituents, but other courts may
prefer the latter to the former.5 2 An important characteristic of
all these precommitments is that they are not forced upon
representatives by state legislatures, Congress, or even voters.
The idea, instead, is that some candidates might experiment with
these contractual arrangements in order to attract voters (or
perhaps just bind themselves). To be intolerant of such
voluntary agreements between candidates and voters is to read
the Constitution as insisting on the trusteeship model of
representation even where a precommitment accommodates
53

flexibility.

In a somewhat similar vein, consider the argument against
precommitment politics derived from the constitutional history
of direct-democracy initiatives. The Framers rejected the idea
of allowing the people to "instruct" their representatives and,
since their time, attempts by state legislatures to instruct
senators have never been held to be legally binding.5 4 Similarly,
52 Similarly, a promise to vote as one's party leaders vote, or to vote as a given,
respected politician votes, may be the most or least preferred precommitment in the
eyes of a given court. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
53 The most glaring disadvantage of the mandate model would seem to be
inflexibility as circumstances change, but at least one of the precommitment strategies
discussed in this Article is quite flexible in requiring the representative to vote
according to the contemporaneous-rather than past election-day-preferences of
constituents. See supra text accompanying notes 22-28. It is noteworthy that the
literature on trusteeship versus mandate models of representation tends to emphasize
deliberation rather than flexibility. See Pitkin, supra note 2, at 63-64, 83-84; see also
supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing deliberation and rules against
absentee voting in deliberative assemblies).
54The Framers rejected a right for the people to instruct their senators. Most
subsequent attempts to instruct came from state legislatures-whose instructions might
be more threatening to the national legislature than those of the people-and were
directed at sitting senators. See Kris W. Kobach, Note, Rethinking Article V: Term
Limits and the Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendments, 103 Yale L.J. 1971,1974-76
(1994). In 1812, the General Assembly of Virginia did resolve to instruct future
representatives and it warned that "no man ought henceforth to accept the
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an attempt by the voters of Ohio to amend their state
constitution in order to require referendum approval for
amendments to the United States Constitution was rejected by
the Supreme Court, which held that the Constitution required
ratification by "deliberative assemblages representative of the
people" and not by popular elections. 55 Finally, the Court's
recent term limits decision can be seen as a strike against direct
appointment of a Senator of the United States from Virginia, who doth not hold
himself bound to obey such instructions." Resolution of the General Assembly from
Feb. 20, 1812, 1812 Va. Acts 152. But state governments were never able to gain
concrete legal support for their attempts to bind legislators. See generally Robert
Luce, Legislative Principles 460-91 (1930) (recounting the history of instructions to
Congressional representatives). At the same time, states can use what might be called
formal advisory referenda in order to tell their representatives what they think. See,
e.g., Kimble v. Swackhamer, 439 U.S. 1385 (1978) (Rehnquist, Cir. J.) (denying
application for relief from Nevada Supreme Court holding that advisory referendum
on Equal Rights Amendment was consistent with Article V). Finally, there is an
optimistic view that the desire to instruct died out because as communication
improved and interest groups organized, citizens had alternative means of reaching the
"same result." Henry Cabot Lodge, The Public Opinion Bill, in The Democracy of
the Constitution 1, 10 (1915).
55 Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 227 (1920). Following Hawke, there has been
something of a mixed reception to precommitments and related questions. In
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), the Court reacted to the question of whether
Kansas had ratified a proposed amendment to the Constitution (regarding child labor),
when Kansas first rejected and then approved the amendment twelve years later, by
declaring that this was a political question and in the hands of Congress. Id. at 450.
Plainly, the Court could have said the same in Hawke, and it could have said the same
in the term limits decision discussed presently. See infra notes 56-59 and
accompanying text.
Decisions that come closest to the central questions associated with precommitment
politics include In Re Opinions of the Justices, 148 So. 107 (Ala. 1933), dealing with
Alabama's convention to consider ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment. The
state organized the required convention-but delegates, chosen and allocated by
county, had to take an oath to abide by the results of a statewide referendum. See id.
at 108. The court advised that the scheme was acceptable, noting that deliberation
would precede the convention and that the manner of instructing delegates was little
different from the pledge of electors to follow the popular choice of the people for the
offices of President and Vice President. Id. at 111. Note, however, that in the
Alabama scheme the state legislature was involved in pledging the delegates-and was
not required to abdicate its constitutional role in the amendment process by an
external or even populist force. In contrast, in AFL-CIO v. Eu, 686 P.2d 609 (Cal.
1984), the court disallowed a ballot initiative which, if passed, would have called for
the state's legislators to request a constitutional convention on the subject of a
balanced-budget amendment-upon penalty of losing their salaries. See id. at 622;
accord State ex rel. Harper v. Waltermire, 691 P.2d 826, 828 (Mont. 1984) (reasoning
that "[t]he "electorate cannot circumvent their Constitution by indirectly doing that
[legislative resolution] which cannot be done directly").
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democracy and against precommitment experiments more
generally.56 The term limit qualification for congressional
candidates came to the Court from the voters of Arkansas who

amended their state constitution, and not from a state
legislature, whose initiatives might be rejected because of a view

that the Framers were careful to protect Congress from other
sources of political power.57

But Justice Stevens noted that

"[t]he people of the State of Arkansas have no more power than
does the Arkansas Legislature to supplement the qualifications

for service in Congress," 58 and that to allow citizens of one state
to exercise such power would undermine "the uniformity and the

national character that the Framers envisioned and sought to
ensure." 59
But these bits of precedent need not doom precommitment
politics. Attempts to instruct representatives have historically
come from state legislatures and not from aspiring candidates

themselves. Moreover, at least one of the precommitment plans
advanced here accommodates a degree of flexibility that
"instructions" did not.60 The history of judicial hostility to
instructing representatives does not, therefore, say much about
56U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
57See id. at 1858. Twenty years earlier, a lower court apparently underestimated the
threat to the national legislature from nonuniformity and state legislatures. See Dyer
v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291, 1308-09 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (holding that Illinois had not
ratified the Equal Rights Amendment because the Illinois General Assembly's
majority approval of the amendment fell short of Illinois General Assembly rule
requiring three-fifths vote). One alternative view is that Justice Stevens, the author
of both Dyerand Thornton, developed something of an inside-the-Beltway perspective
in the years between these two decisions. Another is that states are individually
empowered by Article V and not so empowered with regard to general elections to
fill Congressional seats. The decision in Dyer is framed in terms of Article V's
delegation to the states. See id at 1294.
58Thornton, 115 S.Ct. at 1864 n.32.
59 Id. at 1864. One reading of the decision is that some Justices regard a
constitutional amendment as the only route to term limits. On the other hand, what
if Arkansas passed a law allowing candidates to contract in advance not to run for a
third term of office? Such a law may be doomed, but there is room to argue that the
Court has not said that politicians and voters cannot precommit to the term limits
idea. Perhaps a bare legislative majority simply cannot bind an unwilling minority to
term limits. In any event, most of the precommitments discussed in this Article are
even more remote from Thornton.
60See supra text accompanying notes 22-28 (advocating a precommitment strategy
binding representatives to the results of contemporaneous constituent surveys or
juries).

HeinOnline -- 82 Va. L. Rev. 594 1996

1996]

Precommitment Politics

595

the likely reaction to precommitments designed by candidates
themselves. Similarly, the hostility toward precommitments by
a state legislature regarding its role in ratifying a constitutional
amendment is somewhat inapposite.
Article V of the
Constitution is rather specific about the possible methods of
ratification; indeed, it comes close to declaring that its listed
provisions are exclusive. 61 In comparison, campaign promises
are simply not addressed in the Constitution and, apart from the
Speech or Debate Clause, 62 the enforcement of political
precommitments trespasses on no explicit constitutional
provision. Finally, term limits are not only more closely
implicated than are precommitments in the text of the
Constitution, because the Qualifications Clause might be read as
exclusive, but also they generate a kind of inflexibility that
precommitment politics does not,63 and they are imposed even
on unwilling representatives-while the constraints explored in
this Article are to be "imposed" only on volunteer
precommitters. Much as courts are generally inclined to enforce
contracts between consenting parties, but to be cautious about
imposing obligations on all citizens or all businesses, so too we
ought to expect that (even those) courts which are prepared to
tolerate enforceable political promises made by individual
candidates will nevertheless be suspicious of precommitments
forcing all future voters and candidates to limit political service
to a specified number of terms.
Campaign finance law provides a useful illustration of the
legal potential of precommitment politics. At first blush, the

61 By its terms, Article V expressly vests in Congress the right to determine
ratification procedures:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or on the Application of the
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for
proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and
Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three
fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the
one or the other Mode of Ratificationmay be proposed by the Congress ....
U.S. Const. art. V (emphasis added).
6 See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
63At least the brand of precommitment politics that tracks the changing preferences
of informed voters. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court's decision, in Buckley v. Valeo, 64 that it is
unconstitutional for Congress to set expenditure limits on
political campaigns would seem to be yet another indication that
politicians cannot be bound and, more important, that there is
no particular tolerance for innovations designed to reduce the
power of organized interest groups. 65 But Buckley v. Valeo does
not bar voluntary expenditure limits. In fact, the surviving
strategy of campaign finance law has been for most presidential
candidates to agree to spending limits-with an implied
liquidated damages clause in the form of the forfeit of public
money.66 Precommitment politics of the kind described in this
Article can thus be consistent with current campaign finance law,
for a precommitting candidate would voluntarily agree to a
course of action that could not otherwise be required, and would
forfeit campaign funds or other economic benefits if this
agreement were broken.
E.

Summary

There may not be much of a puzzle in why aspiring politicians
do not precommit either to be responsive, anti-Burkean
representatives or simply to be taken seriously with regard to
issue-specific campaign promises. It may simply seem difficult
or even impossible to offer one's constituents convincing,
enforceable precommitments.
The simplest enforcement
mechanisms would seem at odds with constitutional provisions
or understandings, while more complicated schemes run the risks
created by bribery and other statutes. And to the extent that
there remains an historical puzzle as to why precommitments of
the kind suggested here were not made before many of these
statutes were passed, it may be enough to note that voters'
disgust with interest groups and unresponsive politicians may
have been less complete. On the other hand, I have suggested
6

424 U.S. 1 (1976).

65 The

impact on interest groups is complicated by the fact that the Court is more

protective of First Amendment interests infringed by expenditure limits than by

contribution limits. See generally Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law
§§ 13-27 to 13-29 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing campaign contribution and expenditure

limits).
66See id. at § 13-30 (discussing subsidies to candidates, which are predicated on the
willingness of candidate-recipients to forgo private contributions).
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that there are precommitment strategies that have not been tried
and that could be legally and politically acceptable. In large
part, the success of precommitment politics, if seriously
attempted, would depend on the willingness of courts to read the
Constitution as somewhat hospitable to the notion of
representation that fuels these precommitment notions. One
would not expect courts to tolerate similar precommitments by
aspiring federal judges, 67 for instance, but these same courts
might afford aspiring representatives room to create this sort of
alternative to prevailing political practices. In particular, I have
suggested that courts might (or even should) be most tolerant of
precommitment strategies that rely on incentives funded by
disinterested parties or by the promisors themselves. It is also
possible that the substance of these precommitments matters
more than their form; a precommitment to a flexible procedural
mechanism may be more attractive than one inflexibly geared to
specific votes.
There is, however, an advantage to inflexible, specific
promises. Some courts may be disinclined to enforce political
contracts either because they prefer to avoid the task of
determining when political promises have been breached or
because they fear that these determinations will involve them in
the world of politics in a way that is inconsistent with some ideal
conception of the separation of the branches of government. If
so, then it is noteworthy that specific promises are more easily
supervised than are promises to adhere to flexible procedural
mechanisms. And the problem of judicial over-involvement
suggests that effective precommitments might include third-party
arbiters. 68 The problem of judicial involvement also suggests the
importance of the expectation of some social gain from political
contracts.
Thus, we might expect courts to tolerate
commitments to vote against agricultural subsidies more readily
than they would help enforce a promise by a presidential
candidate to nominate someone for a cabinet post in return for
support during the election process.
A very different reaction to the failure of politicians to test
the legal limit of precommitment politics is that voters may not
67

See supra note 34.

68 See supra Part I.C.3.
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be as unhappy with their representation as are some positive
political theorists. There is both a positive and normative
component to this point. As a positive matter, politicians may
correctly sense that most voters are not terribly concerned about
organized interest groups or even about broken promises.
Alternatively, voters may think that a representative who either
abides by instructions from home or woodenly keeps to
campaign promises will miss out on too many opportunities to
bring home the bacon.
And as a normative matter,
precommitment schemes may be a bad idea, so that courts
should use existing statutes and constitutional interpretations to
enfeeble them, because (the argument goes) neither organized
interest groups nor cheap campaign promises are much of a
problem. Finally, there is a reaction to precommitment schemes
that says more about those who react than it does about the
puzzle of political behavior or normative suggestions: Readers
who find themselves hostile to attempts to precommit to survey
groups may simply be revealing that they do not find "politics as
usual" so bad as to be worth overhauling. 69 On the other hand,
those who think that commercial contract law and theory has
something to offer politics and those who see the Burkean
model as ignoring the ability of organized interests to capture
representatives
or political parties may regard the
precommitment idea as something more valuable than a mere
tool with which to explore the world we know where politics and
contracts do not much mix.

6 The mixed evidence on these matters is well known. Voters favor term limits at
the same time that they claim to like their own representatives (but not others) just
fine. On the paradox that voters like their representatives but dislike Congress, see
Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn & Morris Fiorina, The Personal Vote: Constituency Service
and Electoral Independence 198-206 (1987). Note that the lack of party discipline in

the United States facilitates this phenomenon, because representatives have a good

deal of freedom to take positions popular in the district but not supported by the party
as a whole. In Great Britain, for example, where party discipline is stronger, this
phenomenon is much less dramatic. Id. at 200-01.
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II. COORDINATED PRECOMMITMENTS
A. Introduction
Once we entertain the idea that politicians might try to
appeal to voters (or even to precommit to their own publicregarding instincts) with political precommitments-and that
courts might tolerate this importation of contracts into
politics-there is the question of what other kinds of
The most interesting
precommitments might materialize.
precommitments might be those in which the promisors attempt
to increase their aggregate political power and therefore their
individual political strength as well. Put differently, if political
contracts can reduce agency costs, as discussed in Part I, then
such contracts may also be used among principals (or among
agents) with shared preferences. Strategic voters or legislators 7O
might, for example, contract in order to overcome collective
action problems. A constitutional amendment requiring a
balanced budget, for instance, may seem attractive to legislators
who seek to promote fiscal responsibility but who, in the
absence of a means of cooperation, find themselves favoring
spending programs that benefit their constituents or themselves
at the expense of the nation as a whole. I have already
suggested that individual politicians may be able to precommit
in an effective manner without going through the trouble and
time of a constitutional amendment.
B. Cooperation by Self-Selected Individuals
1. Bloc Voting
Consider first the political power of a unified and
homogeneous group such as that which resided in Kiryas Joel,
a village entirely populated by a Hasidic sect, and made famous
by the Supreme Court's recent invalidation of New York State's
unusual arrangement to carve out a local school district that
could use tax-generated funds to provide statutorily-required
special-education teachers and facilities for handicapped children
while allowing these children to remain segregated and separated
70 For

a discussion of this distinction, see Saul Levmore, Parliamentary Law, Majority

Decisionmaking, and the Voting Paradox, 75 Va. L. Rev. 971, 985 n.43 (1989).
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from outsiders. 71 It is apparent from the decision, and from the
actions which followed it,72 that the residents of Kiryas Joel had

substantial political power. The Governor of New York appears
to have been eager to please the village, or perhaps to keep a
bargain with the members of the sect, and there seems to have73

been little fear of disapproval by other voters in that state.

There is every reason to think that the residents of Kiryas Joel,

as members of the Hasidic sect, enjoyed regular communication

with their leaders. 74 The leadership is able to generate high

voter turnout; the demographic concentration of the group (in
Kiryas Joel and elsewhere) simplifies ex post monitoring by
71 See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481
(1994). Kiryas Joel is an incorporated village in New York populated entirely by
Satmar Hasidim, an Orthodox Jewish sect. A brief history of the village and the sect
is contained in Justice Souter's opinion for the Court. Id. at 2484-86. As for the
arrangement between the state and the sect, "[i]t is undisputed that those who
negotiated the village boundaries when applying the general village incorporation
statute drew them so as to exclude all but Satmars, and that the New York Legislature
was well aware that the village remained exclusively Satmar in 1989 .... " Id. at 2489.
72 Within two weeks of the Supreme Court's opinion in the case, the then-Governor
of New York, Mario Cuomo, signed a new bill which sought to keep the school open
while complying with the Court's ruling. Cuomo Signs a Bill to Keep a Hasidic School
Open, N.Y. Times, July 9, 1994, § 1, at 24. The new law attempted to win (at least
Justice O'Connor's) approval by allowing any community meeting specific conditions
to. form its own school district, see Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2498 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), and was in this way technically,
or superficially, religiously neutral (although critics consider it a sham and claim that
only Kiryas Joel can meet the specified requirements). See Alison Wheeler, Recent
Developments, Separatist Religious Groups and the Establishment Clause-Boardof
Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct 2481 (1994), 30
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 223, 241-46 (1995) (arguing that the decision in Kiryas Joel
was too narrow and advocating application of an equal protection strict scrutiny test).
The law was then upheld by the very lower court judge who had struck down the
original legislation. Joseph Berger, Court Affirms Public School for Hasidim: District
for the Disabled is Ruled Constitutional, N.Y. Times, March 9, 1995, at B1.
73 Opponents of the law claimed that it was the result of interest group politics and
concern for Jewish votes. See Berger, supra note 72, at B4; see also A Poor Solution
for Kiryas Joel, N.Y. Times, July 28, 1994, at A22 (criticizing legislature's behavior as
a "swift election-year move... [that] suggests more concern for politics than law").
74 Hasidic sects are among those groups that seem inclined to follow leaders with
little fear that the leaders' views are self-serving. Inasmuch as the leaders do not
appear to value personal wealth, and give instructions and advice that appear to be
in the interests of the constituents, however socially constructed these interests may
seem to outsiders, there is little danger that the leaders will be unable to deliver the
votes and actions they promise. For a discussion of Hasidic political culture, see
Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96 Colum. L. Rev.
1 (1996).
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politicians; and it is even plausible for the group to switch its
support to a competing political party if a better deal is available
or if the long-term returns from such a demonstration seem
positive. The tightly-knit nature of this group facilitates some of
these capabilities, but other aspects of the collective action
problem are naturally overcome by the similarity of interests
among group members. The leaders do not need to convince
members to sacrifice short-term interests in order to obtain
greater long-term gains, for it is likely that the very reasons the
leaders prefer a given candidate cause virtually all members of
the group to prefer that candidate as well.
The apparent political success of the residents of Kiryas Joel
suggests that other, less homogeneous, groups might do well to
attempt to do that which comes easily to the residents of Kiryas
Joel. Relatively like-minded voters might agree to vote as a
bloc. What is necessary in the way of like-mindedness is
sufficient homogeneity to cause each member to calculate that
on average he or she will be better off if the group as a whole
gets its way more often than in the absence of cooperative
voting. The residents of Kiryas Joel might have calculated that
they were virtually always better off voting as a bloc, but other
groups, with greater than average homogeneity of preferences,
might see that they too would more often than not benefit from
bloc voting.
Consider, by way of illustration, an individual, A, who has
experiences which suggest that about fifty-five percent of the
time she approves of the politicians or policy options which
surveys suggest her fellow citizens prefer. At the same time,
there is a subset of the population, group G, that A finds herself
in agreement with seventy-five percent of the time. A is unable
to refine further these connections; A may not know that her
agreements or disagreements are about social issues or tax policy
or any particular subset of legislative matters. A may simply
have things in common with other members of G such that A
and G agree significantly more often than do A and the
population or even the Congress as a whole. Indeed, we can
imagine further that every member of G has the same
expectation as A; every member of G expects to agree with the
majority of G seventy-five percent of the time. The members of
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G may share ethnic, racial, or economic characteristics, or they
may all be college graduates living in the Northwest, and so
forth.
Imagine next that voter A is offered the option of a rule
under which G alone elects public officials or under which the
Congress delegates all its decisionmaking authority to G.
Generally speaking, A might like these (inconceivable and
unconstitutional) rules because A's preferences are closer to G
than to those of the population or of Congress as a whole. A
gains when G's votes carry more weight. But bloc voting by G
is little more than a step in this direction. A would like to agree
to vote with the majority in G if all other members of G do the
same, because to do so increases the expected value of A's vote.
If all members of G always vote as the majority of G suggests,
and if A is in this majority seventy-five percent of the time, then
seventy-five percent of the time A's vote will be
magnified-because the twenty-five percent of G that disagrees
will feel bound to vote as A and the majority of G prefer. Much
less frequently, or in this case one-third as often, A will be in
the minority and, if A follows the precommitment strategy, A
will then vote with the majority. But if all members of G keep
to the plan, this sacrifice is worthwhile because it is three times
as likely that A's vote will be multiplied (by 1.33) than that it
will be suppressed or indeed perverted by the "obligation" to
vote with the majority of G. As discussed presently, the
intuition behind this example is illustrated by the inclination of
some members of the United Nations to form voting blocs.75
One example of such a group, which might have a strong
degree of "like-mindedness" across the spectrum of political
issues or likely candidates, is a labor union. Unfortunately,
perhaps, the agency problem may dominate this example, as
members may be insufficiently confident in their leaders to abide
by seemingly wrongheaded and even self-serving instructions. It
is interesting that while endorsements by labor union leaders of
political candidates are common, union leaders do not attempt
to increase the long-term political power of their members by
polling the rank and file, in order to determine the majority
75See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
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position, and advising all members to vote as one with this
majority. A union leader who sought to be something more
than a passive intermediary might estimate (or discover)
members' preferences and then bargain with candidates or other
groups in a way that increases the power of the precommitting
members. The leader could then explain to the members why
there is gain to be had from bloc voting. In any event, greater
gains are available the more the leader is able to generate voter
turnout and the more it is credible that the leader might
endorse-and that constituents might then follow-any
candidate.7 6 In contrast, the more a given politician or political
party can take the support and turnout of a specific group for
granted-regardless of the bargains it strikes around the present
election-the less political power that group is likely to enjoy.
It should be noted that the amount of power gained from the
ability to threaten (and in fact) to switch the party "loyalties" of
a large group is difficult to calculate. This is because of the
complicating influence of agenda-setting and candidate selection
by parties through primaries and other means. Reliable
constituent groups may well have substantial power when it
comes to choosing a party's candidate. In short, although there
is the familiar question of whether markets and politics respond
best to marginal or inframarginal players, or to transient or longterm customers, it is at least plausible that, other things being
equal, there is something to be gained from a credible threat to
exit.77
It is unclear whether the best candidates for these bloc
precommitment plans are newly-created groups of like-minded
voters or established interest groups. Members of the National
Rifle Association or the Sierra Club or the Friends of St.
Raphael's Hospital may find that while ninety-nine percent
agree on their central mission (for that is why they belong to a
common organization), seventy-five percent agree on which
candidate to vote for in any given election (or indeed on any
issue likely to come before the representatives they elect). We
76 Note that politicians court modern labor union leaders more for the financial
support and human resources they command than for their influence on voting
behavior. See Graham K. Wilson, Interest Groups in the United States 34-53 (1981).
77 See Albert 0. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty 82 (1970).
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might expect these organizations, formed around a single issue,
to expand to other concerns (either because the managing agents
gain by expanding or because a seventy-five percent majority
agrees on each expansion in incremental fashion). On the other
hand, this sort of growth, or diversification, might lead to
defections from the original organization. The defectors might
form new organizations committed to the original, single issue
or perhaps devoted to the original position plus the minority
position on a secondary matter. It is difficult to predict the
evolutionary pattern. The National Organization of Women and
the American Association of Retired Persons appear to follow
the diversification strategy, while the National Rifle Association
and the Sierra Club do not.78 It is thus unclear whether the best
vehicle for a precommitting voting bloc would be something like
the group of African-American college graduates living in
Manhattan or the members of the Alumni Association of
Oberlin College (assuming for the sake of argument that both
groups have about the same level of "like-mindedness"). The
latter group has already organized, so it has transaction cost
advantages but something to lose from defections.
It goes almost without saying that the thought experiment I
have been conducting with (largely) self-selecting, precommitting
voting blocs cannot proceed much longer without some
recognition of the practical problems that would be encountered
in any attempt to carry out such a scheme. The central problem
is that when a member of the bloc is called upon to cast an
unattractive (in the short term) vote, there will be a tendency for
that person to defect. Member A may precommit because she
sees that she will be in a majority of the group seventy-five
percent of the time, but when A sees that the agreement calls
for her to vote for a candidate she does not much like, A will
wish to defect and vote for the candidate of her choice.79 Some
78 This question of diversification and expansion has been studied in the context of
voting blocs of members of the United Nations. See Frans N. Stokman, Roll Calls and

Sponsorship: A Methodological Analysis of Third World Group Formation in the

United Nations 168-69 (1977).
79 Citizen A may instead wish simply to abstain from voting or to cast a blank ballot,
perhaps as a way of compromising between her promise to vote with the group and
her personal inclination to do otherwise. But there is no need to pursue this part of
the precommitment problem inasmuch as the "puzzle" of non-precommitment is found
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part of this problem can be associated with the institution of the
secret ballot. There is also an agency problem inherent in this
sort of precommitment scheme-and in this sense the
cooperation problem is something more than a simple prisoner's
dilemma. The strategy requires virtually all members of the
precommitting group to vote as a bloc, even or especially when
their short-term preferences suggest a different vote. But it is
precisely when such votes are required that members of the
group will fear that their leaders are selfishly misinstructing
them.80 In short, precommitments by a like-minded group would
appear to collapse because of collective action problems,
including somewhat subtle agency problems.
A more academic-but still collective actionrelated-objection to this idea of rationally participating in a
plan to vote with the majority of a like-minded group, is that an
individual voter cannot possibly think that her vote is likely to
affect the outcome of the larger election. A may vote in a
general election, the argument goes, because A gets consumption
value from voting, but A cannot possibly expect to have the tiebreaking vote that carries one politician rather than another into
office.81 But this objection strengthens rather than weakens the
precommitment idea. If A would normally reason that her vote
is worthless, then she would also reason that she loses nothing
worthwhile by voting as she precommits even though it is
contrary to her short-term preferences. It is even tempting to
suggest that A might now reason that her vote is finally worth
casting because it is often magnified.8 2 But the better claim may
even in democracies with compulsory voting.
80 One way around this problem is to precommit only to vote as a majority of the
group decides to vote. Imagine, for example, that members of a union thought both
that they had enough in common to make the long-term advantages of a

precommitment strategy worthwhile and that their leadership would not necessarily
provide instructions that reflected their preferences. The members might simply agree

to employ a pollster or to use the union mailing list in order to ascertain the
preferences of the majority-and then all members would vote as a majority of the
members indicated. Members who found themselves in the minority might abide by

their precommitments in anticipation of long-run advantages.

81For an overview of the debate on the rationality of voting, see Dennis C. Mueller,
Public Choice II 348-61 (1989).
82 The matter is complicated and therefore only tempting. When A votes for X
rather than X's opponent Y, that decision is worth more to X than one made by A to

vote for X instead of "rationally" staying home. The intuition in the text is similar to
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simply be that the best explanation for A's energy on election
day is that A enjoys sentiments associated with patriotism or
bonding with other voters. In turn, this explanation for
individual voting behavior is consistent with the idea that a voter
might gain utility from cooperating and bonding with likeminded voters.
2. Cooperationand Contract
There remains, of course, the central problem that A and
other "rational" members of G will freeride, hoping that other
(self-selecting) members abide by their promises but reasoning
that there is no gain from voting in a way that is selfishly
unappealing. There are at least two kinds of reactions to this
point. The first is to note that real people cooperate in myriad
settings despite the apparent rationality of freeriding, and we
might therefore expect that many members of G will in fact
cooperate when it comes to voting behavior. Charitable
contributions, political participation, protest rallies, and various
elements of etiquette come to mind in this regard. But since this
is hardly the place to develop a theory of the development of
effective social norms, I claim only that precommitment
strategies of the kind sketched here are not impossible to carry
out. In any event, because it seems that the most likely setting
in which cooperation could dominate defection is where ballots
are not secret, I turn presently to bloc precommitments by or
among elected representatives whose votes are, of course, public.
The second reaction to the stubborn collective action problem
is to consider, once again, contractual mechanisms for the
enforcement of political precommitments. If members of G wish
to cooperate, and they realize that each member will have an
incentive to defect even though in the aggregate these defections
will destroy the potential gains from trade, then they may
welcome ex ante contracts that bind them to their common mast.
This returns us, of course, to the discussion in Part I. One
difference between that setting, with precommitting aspiring
the idea that charitable giving, which suffers from a very similar collective action
problem, might be encouraged by magnifying each gift with the promise of "matching
funds."
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representatives, and the present one, involving voters in a
general election, is that the institution of the secret ballot in the
general election makes enforcement yet more difficult. A
second difference, the absence of any explicit constitutional
problem, may be liberating.8 3 Finally, it is possible that
commitments among voters are even more vulnerable to claims
of "vote buying" than are arrangements between candidates for
office and the voters they court.84 The central idea is that likeminded voters might wish to precommit simply to gain the
rewards available to bloc voters, but if the collective action
problem in a dispersed group makes cooperation difficult, then
like-minded voters might wish to precommit to make financial
sacrifices in the event of breaches. But because the point of
these precommitments will often be to empower a group of
voters at the expense of other voters-and there is no reason to
think that this kind of precommitment politics will enfeeble
organized interests or promote popular sovereignty-courts are
(or should be) unlikely to tolerate what can be described as vote
buying.
The contrary argument, in favor of tolerating and therefore
enforcing these precommitments by individual voters to vote as
a group, is that inasmuch as there are presently well-organized
groups that are able to wield political power, the democratic
process would be improved by allowing other groups to compete
on equal terms. Members of an Hasidic sect may live near one
another and members of a labor union may have a legal means
of taxing one another and avoiding freerider problems, but other
83 A textualist might have objected to agreements by legislators as to how they would
vote as running into something of a Speech or Debate Clause problem. See supra
notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
84 See 18 U.S.C. § 597 (1994) (criminalizing expenditures to influence voting); 18

U.S.C. § 594 (1994) (criminalizing intimidation of voters). In response, the argument

advanced here is that vote buying concerns us because it is likely to disadvantage
disenfranchised and less wealthy citizens; the sort of vote buying, which is to say
mutual precommitting, suggested here might be unobjectionable because it is likely to
benefit these very groups. For a recent discussion of the relationship between vote
buying and election laws, see Pamela S. Karlan, Not By Money But By Virtue Won?
Vote Trafficking and the Voting Rights System, 80 Va. L. Rev. 1455 (1994) (arguing

that voting laws are designed not to protect voter autonomy but to advance broader
social goals). Note that the institution of secret ballots makes all forms of voting
bargains more difficult.

HeinOnline -- 82 Va. L. Rev. 607 1996

608

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 82:567

like-minded citizens may be at a relative disadvantage in
overcoming collective action problems. There is no reason why
constitutional or voting rights law should favor groups that
happen to have geographic (or various other) advantages. 8 5
Indeed, it is plausible that historically disenfranchised voters
would be the primary beneficiaries of a decision to tolerate
contracts to vote as a group. There remains, of course, the
question of how to design such contractual arrangements.

It goes almost without saying that contractual commitments of
this sort will seem preposterous to most courts and readers.
Even if a group of voters had a method of monitoring members'
votes, it would seem that any agreement to vote as a majority of

the group instructs (or as a leader or designated third party
instructs) is unenforceable. It is implausible that courts will
order either specific performance or the invalidation of votes
cast contrary to the agreement-even though such remedies are
not unknown with respect to voting agreements in corporate
law.86 The remaining, now familiar, option is for the parties to
precommit to financial penalties in the event of breach. Again,

85
Labor unions might enjoy advantages bestowed by labor law itself, but even these
advantages in overcoming collective action problems were not granted in order to
facilitate bloc voting at the expense of other interest groups. Of course, the optimistic
story about labor unions and geographically advantaged groups is that such groups will
join in national debates and promote the republican ideal. In some sense the legal
arguments for and against many of the schemes explored in this Article mirror the
arguments about the wisdom or constitutional basis for "reviving" republicanism. See
generally Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale L.J. 1539 (1988)
(describing those aspects of republicanism that have the strongest claim to
contemporary support).
86 See, e.g., Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 22-26 (Del. Ch. 1982) (approving
agreement for corporation to lend three million dollars to shareholder in return for
a particular vote); Rarnos v. Estrada, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 833, 837 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)
(enforcing shareholder vote agreement); Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577, 586 (Ill.
1964) (same). For an overview of the broad spectrum of enforceable corporate voting
agreements, see Thomas J. Andr6, Jr., A Preliminary Inquiry into the Utility of Vote
Buying in the Market for Corporate Control, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 533 (1990) (reviewing
judicial responses to corporate vote buying and considering the consequences of vote
buying for corporate governance); see also Robert C. Clark, Vote Buying and
Corporate Law, 29 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 776 (1979) (exploring arguments in favor of
permitting trading in proxy rights); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting
in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & Econ. 395 (1983) (rejecting arguments in favor of the free
trading of proxies).
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conventional wisdom is that such agreements must be
unenforceable because they amount to vote buying.8 7
There is, however, something to be said for enforcing mutual
precommitments to vote as a bloc. First, the paramount
objection to raw vote buying-that wealth will prevail where it
should not-is eliminated or even reversed because the
precommitments are mutual. The parties could even agree to
larger penalties for breaches by wealthier members of the group.
Second, the contractual freedom to enter into enforceable 88
mutual precommitments will empower many voters, and as a
general rule there is no legal objection to contracts that simply
prove, ex post, to burden a right. Much as a contract to rent a
pew for a religious service is surely enforceable against a party
who later wishes to worship at a different church but is
discouraged by the prospect of contract damages, so too a
contract to vote for a candidate (who may be determined by
some survey) could be enforceable against a voter who came to
regret the agreement to vote cooperatively. Both contracts are
used to overcome collective action problems and both have the
potential to raise the value of a fundamental legal right in ex
ante terms-even though both can be said to constrain the
exercise of a right (occasionally) in ex post terms. Finally, there
is some precedent for this sort of enforcement. Political parties
can require mutual support, or loyalty agreements, and they can
exclude candidates who have not supported the party's candidate
in the past.89
87 For an interesting early case, exhibiting hostility to agreements linking financial
incentives to participatory democracy, see Denney v. Elkins, 7 F. Cas. 464, 466-67
(C.C.D.C. 1831) (No. 3790) (voiding promissory note given as wager on whether or
not Andrew Jackson would receive Kentucky's electoral vote despite the fact that
neither gambler could vote in Kentucky election). Other cases are collected in 17
C.J.S. Contracts § 218 (1963).
88 Note, once again, that enforceability may amount to nothing more than token
damages. But this piece of contract law may be more than enough to keep voters
from defecting.
81 See Polly v. Navarro, 457 So. 2d 1140, 1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (upholding
state law prohibiting the nomination of candidates who had been nominated by
another political party within the previous six months); Lippitt v. Cipollone, 337 F.
Supp. 1405, 1406-07 (N.D. Ohio 1971), affd, 404 U.S. 1032 (1972) (upholding law
prohibiting the nomination of candidates who had voted in another party's primary
within the previous four years). But see Kay v. Brown, 424 F. Supp. 588, 594 (S.D.
Ohio 1976) (holding unconstitutional the same Ohio statute upheld in Lippitt as
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The preceding arguments are surely academic. There is every
reason to think that while courts would not regard mutual

precommitments as criminal or wrong, in the manner of outright
vote buying, they would refuse to enforce them. But there is
also reason to think that if a state specifically authorized such
contracts and their enforcement, courts would have no

constitutional reason to demur. 90 That state legislatures do not
invite such precommitments with statutory authorization and
enforcement may reflect either a failure of imagination or the
intuition that precommitments would empower relatively
unorganized groups and therefore weaken the position of
organized groups.
Given the possibility that legislatures would authorize these

precommitment contracts and even the chance that courts might

enforce them without legislative intervention, it is useful to
explore the problem of designing these precommitment contracts
in the real world-where secret ballots would seem to make the

problem of monitoring contractual performance an impossible
one. Of course, a state legislature might also decide to do away
with secret ballots, or to permit voters the option of voting

openly (in which case a precommitment to bloc voting might

entail an agreement to pay damages if one defected or if one

chose to cast a secret ballot). But the immediate question is

applied to a candidate who had voted in the primary of the American Independent
Party-which was defunct by the time of the court's decision). The court in Kay v.
Brown and the drafters of the statute seem to have been concerned about the claim
that the two major parties will collude in obstructing the formation of third parties.
90 As a constitutional matter the states have broad latitude in setting election
procedures because "[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators
and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but
the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the
Places of chusing Senators." U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. See also, e.g., Burdick v.
Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 438-39 (1992) (holding that state ban on write-in voting was
constitutional even when only one candidate was on the ballot); Storer v. Brown, 415
U.S. 724, 728-37 (1974) (upholding California's restrictions on candidate access to
ballots). If, however, a state law results in the diminution of a protected minority's
voting strength, then federal courts would likely intervene under Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994), which prohibits any voting practices which
result in discrimination. See generally Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986)
(holding that the test for violations of the Voting Rights Act is broad-based and
results-oriented). Another possible argument against the hypothetical state statute
would be that such a contract constituted intimidation interfering with a citizen's right
to vote for the candidate of her choice in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1971(b) (1994).
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whether precommitments to bloc voting are possible within the
current institutional framework, in which the secret ballot is a
sacred fixture.
One possible method of precommitting, where voters in a
general election with secret ballots are concerned, is to tie
contractual incentives to the results of precinct tallies.91 Another
possible focal point is the simple single fact of an election result.
Finally, exit poll data may be of some use.
Beginning with the available data from individual precincts,
members of a precommitting group like G might be
geographically concentrated, in which case there will be some ex
post monitoring of G's ability to deliver on its promises. We
might even imagine that each member of G would precommit to
pay or forfeit a sum, perhaps to a charity or other entity unlikely
to be accused of vote buying, if the member's precinct does not
deliver more than p% of its vote to the candidate recommended
by the majority of G in a kind of pre-election primary limited to
G, or by the leadership of G which might strike bargains or poll
members before giving election-day instructions. 92 Indeed, there
may be no need to specify a triggering percentage; members of
G may simply agree to forfeit their bonds if the candidate they
chose by majority "vote," in a pre-election survey or "primary,"
fails to win. If4 for example, a majority of G favors candidate X
for the Senate in a pre-election survey, and each member of G
precommits long in advance to forfeit a sum if G's chosen
candidate does not prevail, then every member of G may have
a decent incentive to get out and vote for X-even if in this
particular election candidate Y seems slightly more attractive to
this minority of G.
Where members of G are not geographically concentrated in
any meaningful way, there is some possibility of using
information exacted through exit polls. The hope is that even if
the organizing principle of G is something like membership in
the Sierra Club, so that precinct results fail to capture the
effectiveness of G's precommitment strategy, it may be possible
to ask voters as they exit from the polls whether they are
91These

results may provide the most detailed information available in a system with

secret ballots.
92Where p is chosen based on previous election results and so forth.
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members of G and how they voted. The question is whether

this information is more useful than that obtained by the simple
fact of the election result. Each member of G might precommit
to forfeit some sum if G's candidate fails at the polls, and each
member might also (or instead) precommit to forfeit a sum if

exit poll data suggest that more than z% of G's members
defected. At first blush, the exit poll information seems useless
because a defecting member of G might be expected to vote for

Y but then to insist that she had voted for X in order both to
avoid any penalty for defection and to advertise the power of G
in future elections (when this member expects to be in the
majority of G). But it is possible that each defector would
respond honestly either because each perceives that the marginal
impact of dishonesty is virtually zero93 or because each wants to
register his or her intensity of preferences and disagreement with

other members of G.
These enforcement schemes are patently weak and, as
suggested earlier, likely to be offensive to courts. If defectors

must pay, courts will regard the underlying contract as
unenforceable. And if all members of G must pay upon some
event or poll result, then the underlying contract is likely to be
regarded as unenforceable because it amounts to illegal gambling
on the outcome of the election. 94 In short, there is no shortage
93Put differently, a member of G who is motivated to conform rather than to defect
because of the penalty tied to the overall election result might seem unreliable in exit
polls because there is the very same incentive to contribute to the aggregate exit poll
data in order to avoid a penalty. But a member of G who is insufficiently motivated
by an incentive tied to the simple fact of the election result might be similarly
indifferent to the financial consequences associated with an honest response in the exit
poll. There is reason to think that these exit polls should employ secret ballots rather
than personal interviews. George F. Bishop & Bonnie S. Fisher, "Secret Ballots" and
Self-Reports in an Exit-Poll Experiment, 59 Pub. Opinion Q. 568 (1995) (finding in
a controlled experiment that secret ballot produced more accurate self-reports than
face-to-face interviews).
94 Gambling on elections is illegal even in Nevada. Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 293.830
(Michie 1995). See also Kyne v. Kyne, 106 P.2d 620, 621-22 (Cal. 1940) (barring

gamblers from collecting from sheriff's levy inasmuch as their gamble had been on
outcomes of an election and was therefore illegal). And recall Denney v. Elkins, 7 F.
Cas. 464 (C.C.D.C. 1831) (No. 3790), where the court voided a wager over whether
Andrew Jackson would receive Kentucky's electoral vote even though neither gambler
could vote in Kentucky. It may be possible, however, to place bets in other countries
on American elections. In any event, there are jurisdictions where one can gamble on
local elections. See, e.g., Julian Gibbs, Sideways Glance: Placing a Bet on the
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of doctrinal objections to these schemes and no easy way for
courts to find this kind of precommitment politics to be

constitutionally desirable or in the public interest. It is possible
that such a scheme might succeed if advanced by a group that
was historically disenfranchised, but because this seems unlikely
I will not explore these schemes any further.
I do not mean to leave the impression that because
cooperation and precommitment by individual voters is
unenforceable if done by contract it is therefore nonexistent.
There may be something of a puzzle in why we do not see more

precommitment politics but it is almost surely the case that some
groups are able to overcome the collective action problems
associated with bloc voting. Some unions, and some racial and
ethnic groups, have probably improved their positions by bloc
voting; individual, somewhat self-selecting, members of these
groups have no doubt chosen to vote as they perceive the group

will vote even where their short-term inclinations might have
been to vote (or indeed to encourage the entire group to vote)
for a different candidate. 95 These members understand that in
Outcome of the General Election with the IG Index, Money Marketing, Feb. 6, 1992,
available in Lexis, World Library, ALLWLD File (reviewing methods of betting on
date of election and on number of seats to be won by Tory and Labour parties in
British elections); Nick Comfort, Kennedy Can Keep His Cash from the Bookies,
Scottish Daily Record, June 17,1994, availablein Lexis, World Library, ALLWLD file
(reporting case of Scottish party chief betting against his own slate and announcing
intention of turning over any winnings to party); Tommy's Sure Thing, Scottish Daily
Record, July 2,1994, availablein Lexis, World Library, ALLWLD File (reporting case
of assistant general secretary winning bet on election and announcing he was looking
for a cause in need of a donation).
95It is noteworthy that for the most part the group is nothing more than selfselected. If, for instance, A is identified by skin color or place of worship as belonging
to group X, but in fact A has either short-term or long-term political preferences that •
are unlike those held by the majority of X, then A will simply not vote as "instructed"
by the leaders of X. If X is geographically concentrated, polling results will show that
some presumed members of X did not in fact vote as members of X. And even if X
is geographically dispersed, exit polls and other survey data will show that some
percentage of people who had self-identified (or other) characteristics that superficially
associated them with X did not in fact vote "with" X. X will be shown to be of a
particular size that may well be smaller than first thought. But "defectors" such as A
do not pose much of a precommitment problem for the rest of X or for politicians
who would bargain with X, because voters such as A have little reason to misrepresent
their allegiances. Thus, if most Catholics vote for Democratic candidates, and most
African-Americans also vote for Democrats, and a very high percentage of Catholic
African-Americans vote for Democrats, but A, a Catholic African-American, generally
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the long run there are benefits to higher turnout and bloc voting,
so long as they expect to find themselves significantly more
often than not in the majority of their group or in accord with
the leaders of their group. Such groups must surely extract
more valuable promises from politicians.
It is probably also the case that many more "groups" would be
better off than they are presently if they encouraged such bloc
voting, emulating what I imagine occurs in Kiryas Joel. I
emphasize that these groups can be largely self-selecting.
Members will be those who think they share enough
characteristics and preferences with other self-selecting members
such that they could expect to be in the majority of the group on
most matters. Exit polls and other data will eventually define
the group. We may think in political terms of all AfricanAmericans, or all Jews, or all unionized factory workers as
groups. But it may turn out that the best candidates for bloc
voting are voters who are Latino lawyers, Jews who have visited
Israel, residents of Detroit, union members who own their own
homes, or users of the World Wide Web-because these groups
or subgroups can be tracked through exit polls and may succeed
in voting as suggested by their "leaders" or by a smaller majority
of the group in pre-election polls. Much as some powerful
to
interest groups form even though their members would seem
96
be dispersed and to suffer from collective action problems, so
too some voting blocs are likely to emerge for reasons that are
difficult to identify. Success, it should be noted, does not mean
that home-owning union members voted for a candidate who
promised to maintain the deduction for interest payments on
residential mortgages-for that is a policy this group could be
expected to favor in the short run and in the absence of any
implicit or explicit precommitments. But if for example, ninety
prefers Republicans, A has very little reason to tell pollsters anything other than that
she is a Catholic African-American who voted for the Republicans. Agents who seek
to bargain regarding the majority of Catholic or African-American voters will simply
learn
over time the true size of this group.
96
Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action 159-60 & n.90 (1965), suggests that
non-economic interest groups succeed through the provision of non-public goods to
their members. One survey suggests that "citizen groups" that are independent of a
particular profession or industry tend to rely on outside funding for their formation
and growth. See Jack L. Walker, The Origins and Maintenance of Interest Groups
in America, 77 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 390, 397-401 (1983).
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percent of the members of this group voted for a candidate
whose distinguishing platform plank was to favor subsidies to
colleges, and other survey or economic data suggested that this
policy appeals on its own to seventy percent of this group, then
we might have good evidence of successful bloc voting in the
sense of long-term power enhancement or magnification.
3. Proxies
If courts or state legislatures were willing to tolerate or
authorize enforceable precommitment contracts, but the problem
with such precommitments was the inability of the parties to
monitor one another's performances, then a dramatic but
familiar contractual and legal solution would be to allow voting
by proxy, as is common in corporate law. Put in contractual
terms, like-minded voters, forming a subset of all voters in a
single election or political jurisdiction, could overcome collective
action problems by delegating their franchise to a reliable
intermediary. Even if these proxies were revocable, as agency
law might like, 97 their amalgamation in the hands of someone
who could bargain with other coalitions or simply vote in the
manner preferred by a majority of the principals would go a long
way toward solving the problems associated with self-selecting
precommitments of the kind discussed here. Proxy voting is
such a familiar and unobjectionable practice in corporate law
that it can be difficult to explain why the rules of corporate law
and politics are in this respect so different. 98
97 See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 705 (West 1990) (codifying default rule that proxy
votes are revocable); Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 212 (1991) (same).
98 The voting rights literature sports some enthusiasm for the idea of borrowing
cumulative voting from corporate law in order to empower minority groups. See, e.g.,
Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of
Black Electoral Success, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1077, 1138-39 & n.298 (1991); Pamela S.
Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote
Dilution Litigation, 24 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 173, 231-36 (1989). Meanwhile, the
corporate law literature is not without hints of precommitment strategies. See, e.g.,
Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the
United States, 102 Yale L.J. 1927 (1993) (arguing that the accumulation of large blocks
of voting stock in German and Japanese banks operates as a check on the
independence of corporate management); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational
Investors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 124 (1994)
(proposing that the increasing importance of institutional investors in America could
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If proxies were permitted in general elections and were
effective for more than one election cycle there would be the

potential for truly powerful bloc voting. Proxies would also
increase voter "turnout," which is itself part of the collective
action problem associated with bloc voting. Of course, election

law, unlike corporate law, does not permit the use of proxies.99
Absentee ballots may be a step in the direction of proxies, but

not a single state presently permits "blank" proxies, which could
be used to threaten, bargain, and otherwise maximize the power

of a voting bloc. 100

lead to new cumulative voting strategies designed to amplify the "voice" option of
shareholders).
99 Proxy voting in political elections is extraordinarily rare, and there is a strong
presumption against its legitimacy. See, e.g., State v. Holzmueller, 5 A.2d 251, 254
(Del. Super. Ct. 1939) (nullifying proxy votes in city council election even though
many voters had thought such voting was permitted and even though council may have
adopted rule permitting proxies); Bontempo v. Carey, 165 A.2d 222, 228-30 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1960) (invalidating proxy and unit, or winner take all, voting in
county Democratic Committee procedures). But see Friesen v. People ex rel.
Fletcher, 192 P.2d 430, 435 (Colo. 1948) (permitting proxies in vote to create soil
conservation district despite argument that statute required secret ballots); State ex rel.
Bell v. County Court, 92 S.E.2d 449, 451 (W. Va. 1956) (allowing proxy voting in a
political party county executive committee where no statute prohibited proxies). Some
state statutes permit proxies for certain votes. See, e.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 10, para.
5/1A-7 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (permitting members of the State Board of Elections to
vote by proxy); Cal Elec. Code § 10532 (West Supp. 1996) (allowing proxy voting in
local district elections where authorized by local law); Cal. Elec. Code §§ 7185, 7376
(West Supp. 1996) (providing sample proxy forms for voting in both Democratic and
Republican political party committee meetings).
Proxies are not accepted on the floor of Congress. Congressional Quarterly, Guide
to Congress 468 (4th ed. 1991). Nevertheless, there is something of a substitute for
proxies in the longstanding tradition of pair voting, in which opposing members agree
not to vote so that one or both can be absent from the voting. The pairing
arrangement is not legally binding, but it is widespread. In a "live pair" arrangement,
one member is absent and the member who is present votes but then withdraws the
vote, announcing how both parties would have voted on the issue. In a "general pair,"
members who will be absent from a vote inform the clerk, who then pairs up
legislators. A "specific pair" is a general pair whose positions on the issues are listed
in the record. These pairing arrangements allow members to show both that their
absences were unlikely to have affected substantive results and how they stood on the
issue. See id. at 431. For an example of the rare case where pairing determined
outcome, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 Mich. L.
Rev. 67, 101-02 (1988) (floor amendment failed on a tie vote although a bare majority
of thirty-four Senators favored it, because the thirty-fourth Senator was part of a live
pair with an absent Senator).
100 Absentee voting first became an issue during the Civil War, when states passed
special voting laws for soldiers. Absentee balloting has come to be universal, see
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In deliberative bodies, the case against proxies is that
deliberation is devalued by absentee principals.101 But in general

elections the argument against proxies is likely to have more to
do with the (perhaps unnoticed) link between proxies and open

ballots.102

Thus, there is no tradition of a secret ballot in

corporate law where proxies are common. Proxy voting is not
easily combined with secret ballots, and the logistical problems
associated with this combination may be sufficient to explain the
fact that proxies and secret ballots rarely if ever coexist on a
large scale. 10 3 Proxies and secrecy might coexist if each
Edward B. Moreton, Jr., Note, Voting by Mail, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1261, 1261-62 (1985)
(noting that absentee ballot statutes are found in every American jurisdiction), and
imitative of the qualities of general elections. See, e.g., Peterson v. City of San Diego,
666 P.2d 975, 978 (Cal. 1983) (holding that a mail ballot election did not violate the
California Constitution's requirement for secret voting). Indeed, whenever absentee
ballot voting begins to take on the characteristics of proxy voting, courts are quick to
invalidate the suspicious votes. In Gooch v. Hendrix, 851 P.2d 1321 (Cal. 1993), the
Black American Political Association of California (BAPAC) conducted a
comprehensive school board election campaign which the court found to be illegal.
BAPAC encouraged voters to ask that absentee ballots be mailed to its office.
BAPAC then hand-delivered the ballots to these voters, encouraging them to
complete them on the spot, and offering to mail the ballots on the voter's behalf. The
court insisted that such delegation by absentee voters did not satisfy the statutory
requirement that the voter deliver the ballot either personally, directly by mail, or by
way of a family member designated in the statute as authorized to hand-deliver the
ballot when the voter is unable to do so because of illness or other physical disability.
Id. at 1329; see also Bolden v. Potter, 452 So. 2d 564, 567 (Fla. 1984) (invalidating all
absentee ballots in school board election due to extensive vote buying and other
fraudulent behavior).
101
The Contract with America generated a ban on proxy voting in committees of the
House of Representatives. See H.R. Res. 6, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 104 (1995). Four
months later the ban was modified to permit limited and specific proxy voting (on
specific issues rather than more general delegations of voting power) by committee
members. H.R. Res. 142, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). In the Senate, committees
may allow proxy voting, but only if the absent Senator has been informed on the issue
and has affirmatively requested that his or her position be recorded. Guide to
Congress, supra note 99, at 468.
102 My claim is not that all open ballot systems will permit proxies, but that it is easy
to allow proxies where voting need not be secret.
103 Although most corporations use open voting procedures (with proxy voting),
confidential proxy voting-managed by an intermediary-is used by many large
companies. See Carol Goforth, Proxy Reform as a Means of Increasing Shareholder
Participation in Corporate Governance: Too Little, But Not Too Late, 43 Am. U. L.
Rev. 379, 462 n.496 (1994).
During the colonial period, proxies were permitted in Massachusetts Bay and
Plymouth Colonies, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Maryland and New Jersey, and
balloting was apparently open. See Luce, supra note 54, at 96-112 (recounting
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registered voter were issued a card which could be deposited
with an agent. The agent needs to know how many proxies have
been received, but the agent need not know the identities of the
principals. At the same time, many kinds of fraud, corruption,
and vote selling are best uncovered when there is less secrecy
rather than more; proxies must at least be traceable in order to
prevent gross abuses. It is perhaps not much of a puzzle,
therefore, that would-be participants in a voting bloc do not
lobby their state legislatures for rules which would allow proxies
in general elections.
I hesitate to take a position on the desirability of proxy voting
in general elections. Despite the risks of such a precommitment
strategy, proxies might empower groups that are disadvantaged
in a world of organized interest groups. And in the absence of
proxy voting, there is likely to be little in the way of
precommitment agreements among like-minded individuals
empowered to vote in general elections.
C. Cooperationby Elected Representatives and by
Jurisdictions
1. Precommitments by Like-Minded Politicians
If millions of voters who are free to cast secret ballots face
grave collective action problems in cooperating to form voting
blocs, then it is apparent that elected representatives, who share
regional or ideological interests, may be better candidates for a
cooperative precommitment scheme. One way to think of this
is as a substitute for party discipline. If twelve senators perceive
that they are like-minded, each, for instance, experiencing a
correlation of exactly .75 with respect to how the majority of the
group votes on matters before the Senate, then these twelve
evolution of voting procedures in the colonies); Robert J. Dinkin, Voting in Provincial
America: A Study of Elections in the Thirteen Colonies, 1689-1776, at 137 (1977)
(documenting proxy elections in Connecticut and Rhode Island). The primary purpose
of allowing proxies appears to have been administrative convenience; there is,

however, reason to think that the manipulation of proxy votes in Maryland may have
been used in sophisticated voting strategies. See Luce, supra note 54, at 107-09
(recounting alleged abuses of the proxy power); see also Susan R. Falb, Advice and

Ascent: The Development of the Maryland Assembly 1635-1689, at 38-46 (1986)
(discussing the use of proxies in the Maryland Assembly).
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senators might gain power by precommitting to vote according
to the instructions of the majority of their group. Each
participant could reason (and explain to constituents) that for
every vote in which independence is grudgingly sacrificed there
will be three votes in which the participant's vote is magnified.
This kind of precommitment approaches the idea of a political

party-although a political party might suffer from agency costs
that a precommitting group need not encounter.
The
precommitment idea is also related to the familiar institution of

a congressional caucus, but it comes closest perhaps to the
behavior of a number of groups of self-selecting countries in the
United Nations.104 Open ballots and repeat play surely facilitate

such bloc voting.
American political history is not without its own examples of
groups of elected representatives who appear to have voted
together in ways consciously calculated to sacrifice the shortterm preferences of some members in return for greater overall
power.105 Indeed, the best explanation for a dearth of such
"subparties with discipline" may be that elected representatives
rarely have the kind of reliable but unspecifiable likemindedness necessary to make a disciplined subparty
advantageous.
The contrary explanation is that without

104 See Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., International Organizations in Their Legal Setting 214
(2d ed. 1993). Some of the decision-making procedures followed in the U.N., such as
the practice of meeting in regional caucuses to formulate policy, seem designed to
further these objectives. Indeed, the practice of apportioning elected positions in the
General Assembly among formally-recognized regional groups derives from early
precommitment strategies. See Robert E. Riggs & Jack C. Piano, The United Nations:
International Organization and World Politics 60-64 (2d ed. 1994). At the same time,
roll call voting analyses show less solidarity than might have been expected. See
generally Stokman, supra note 78, at 168-76 (1977) (providing a quantitative analysis
of voting cohesion among groups of developing countries in the United Nations).
105See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests: A Public Choice
Analysis of the Seventeenth Amendment, 73 Or. L. Rev. 1007,1025 (1994) (describing
pre-Seventeenth Amendment practice of candidates for Senate campaigning on behalf
of state legislators who promised to vote for them); David S. Bogen, The
Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment: Reflections from the Admission of
Maryland's First Black Lawyers, 44 Md. L. Rev. 939, 1004 (1985) (describing
precommitment by Republican caucus in drafting the Fourteenth Amendment).
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powerful leaders' 06 to punish defectors, agreements collapse in
the absence of legal enforceability.

The

potential

advantages

of-but

legal

problems

with-substantive and procedural voting precommitments by
representatives have been detailed in Part I. But agreements

among elected representatives are not at all like those which
might be made by candidates who promise either to abide by the

will of their constituents or, more simply, to adhere to their own
specific promises. Political precommitments by individual
politicians to their constituents may offset the influence of
organized interest groups, counteract the realities of modem
campaign finance, and be consistent with the structure of our
Constitution. 107
In contrast, agreements among elected

representatives may be seen as less likely to serve some
democratic interest-and perhaps as even less healthy than

agreements by individual voters to form voting blocs. The
danger, of course, is that organized interest groups or self-

serving politicians could use this precommitment tool to increase
their power.

We might therefore expect courts to be less

tolerant of attempts by representatives to make serious promises
to one another than of attempts by representatives to make
enforceable promises to their own constituents.108
106On the role of party leadership and such figures as "Czar" Joseph Cannon and
Sam Raybum, see George B. Galloway, History of the House of Representatives 13455 (1961) (tracing the history of party leadership in the House); House Comm. on
House Admin., History of the United States House of Representatives, 1789-1994,
H.R. Doc. No. 324, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 106-12 (1994) (discussing House leadership
of Cannon and Rayburn). For a well-known analysis of the role of parties and
leadership in the legislative process, see V.O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties, & Pressure
Groups 653-88 (5th ed. 1964).
107Which is to say that this particular notion of popular sovereignty, imposed on no
one but rather entered into as a kind of contract, may not offend the Constitution's
careful balance among the various sources of political power. A Court that did not
like term limits arising out of direct democracy could nevertheless tolerate an
enforceable contract by a candidate to vote as constituents instructed.
108Precommitments among large numbers of voters, as described in Part II.B.1,
probably fit somewhere between anti-Burkean precommitments and agreements
among elected representatives.
The pro-democracy argument is that such
precommitments might provide an antidote to more easily organized interest groups.
The negative argument is that the device is available only to groups that happen to be
able to self-select and to reveal and prove their power and ability to control defections
(through precinct data or other means). But the winners and losers are unclear. If,
for example, proxies were permitted (by courts or by state law), previously weak
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Congress could, however, enable and even encourage
"subparties," or precommitments by groups of elected
representatives, both by creating internal rules which allow the

wider use of proxies and by altering committee and staffing rules
to reward those who join subparties. Courts would be most
unlikely to interfere with these "internal" rules.109 In turn, given
that Congress has not gone as far as it might to encourage party
(or any subparty) discipline, courts might be thought likely to
refrain from enforcing agreements that raise constitutional
problems because such "intervention" would work changes
equivalent to direct (and unadopted) changes to the internal
rules. Thus, few objections are raised to explicit congressional
precommitments, in the form of irrevocable delegations of

power, such as the decision to vote for or against (with no
modifications of) the recommendations of a commission set up
to recommend the closing of some military bases.11 0 At the same
time, in the absence of this explicit delegation or
groups might at first appear to overcome their collective action problems but
previously organized groups might benefit even more, so that the net winners would
be groups like unions, churches, employers, and other entities able to attract proxies.
109See discussion supra note 35 (speculating that courts might be more tolerant of
internal rules); supra note 101 (indicating that both chambers of the U.S. Congress
currently allow proxies to be used at the committee level). On the relationship
between Article I, Section 5 and the political question doctrine, see generally Michael
B. Miller, Comment, The Justiciability of Legislative Rules and the "Political" Political
Question Doctrine, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 1341 (1990) (reviewing the justiciability of
legislative procedural rules and concluding that such rules should be deemed
nonjusticiable when they raise inherently political questions, such as suits by legislators
challenging legislative procedures); see also Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224
(1993) (rejecting as nonjusticiable the claim that the Constitution requires the entire
Senate to hear evidence in an impeachment trial). There are, however, occasional
warnings that the courts might intervene in the event of truly extreme congressional
rules. See id. at 239 (White, J., concurring in judgment) ("the Senate has wide
discretion... [but] I would prefer not to announce an unreviewable discretion in the
Senate to ignore completely the constitutional direction .... ."); id. at 253-54 (Souter,
J., concurring in judgment) ("[i]f the Senate were to act in a manner seriously
threatening the integrity of its results ... judicial interference might well be
appropriate.").
110
See, e.g., Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment
Act, Pub. L. No. 100-526, § 208, 102 Stat. 2623, 2632-33 (1988) (precommitting to
limited debate and to up-or-down vote on recommendations of base-closing
commission); Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, §§ 151-53, 88 Stat. 1978, 2001-08
(1975) (providing for up-or-down vote with no amendments to trade agreements
negotiated by executive branch). In all these cases, Congress can revisit the earlier
commitment and simply alter its internal rules.
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precommitment, we would not expect courts to enforce an
agreement among a subset of legislators to vote up or down
when deciding on some future program.
This conclusion, or conjecture, applies with some force to
precommitments that appear to be aimed at solving collective
action problems. Thus, if a group of senators precommitted to
pay liquidated damages in the event that they voted to raise the
federal debt ceiling or to create exceptions to a balanced-budget
measure, courts might be expected to refuse to enforce the
promises in the event that a promisor breached (and refused to
pay as promised). Part of the argument in favor of judicial
tolerance is that the arrangement between each promisor and his
or her constituents is voluntary, and that the matter can be
distinguished from cases where precommitments and populist
initiatives have met judicial hostility."' On the other hand, such
coalitions of representatives introduce inflexibility and may
threaten the national legislature. Moreover, it may seem safe
for courts to reject such innovations because the Senate itself
could create enforcement
mechanisms to support
precommitments among its members. In the absence of internal
rules supporting these alliances, those who favor dramatic
solutions to political collective action problems may need to
resort to constitutional amendments.
2. Unions of Jurisdictions
Regional preferences and problems can, quite plainly, generate
political alignments. It is therefore possible to imagine a set of
states attempting to bind their representatives to vote as a bloc,
in order to combat the agency costs associated with elected
representatives who self-servingly value the Burkean ideal, either
because they have their own preferences or because they benefit
from the attention paid to them not so much by their legally
assigned constituents but rather by organized interest groups.
Again, the idea is that these states might have sufficiently
aligned interests so as to make it worthwhile for the residents of
each state to sacrifice the independence of its representatives in
return for the magnifying power of bloc voting.
M1
See supra Part I.D.
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If the collective action problems surrounding this sort of plan
were overcome by using state governments-which might seek
to penalize defectors or reward cooperators-then a new legal
hurdle is the constitutional ban on interstate compacts." 2
Inasmuch as the very point of this kind of agreement would be
to increase the political power of a subset of states with respect
to the other states, there is every reason to think that the Court

would be hostile to this variety of precommitment politics." 3
Again, ex post subsidies to cooperating, faithful representatives

might also run into the bribery or supplemental income

problems." 4 As a practical matter, therefore, precommitment
schemes among jurisdictions may be possible only where the

Federal Constitution is of tangential relevance; an agreement by
a group of counties or other (legal or self-designated) entities

within a single state might, for example, be a testing ground for
the kind of precommitment politics suggested here.
112 "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress... enter into any Agreement
or Compact with another State.... ." U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. Even though this
clause has been construed narrowly by the Supreme Court, a compact designed to
increase the political power of member states could easily run afoul of its prohibition.
See Tribe, supra note 65, at § 6-33. There is even a question as to whether or not
Congress could approve such a compact. See Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440
(1981) (observing that Congress can consent to a compact that is an appropriate
subject for congressional legislation). The basic test, originating in a boundary dispute
settlement, is that the clause prohibits an agreement which increases political power
in the states at the expense of the federal government. See Virginia v. Tennessee, 148
U.S. 503, 519-20 (1893). Thus, an agreement on apportioning state taxes was upheld
in U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978), even though a
more federally-minded Court might have insisted that such an agreement increased the
relative power of states with respect to multistate businesses or avoided putting the
states in a position where they would have needed congressional approval (and might
have needed to bargain away something or other in order to obtain such approval).
For arguments that the Compact Clause need not be a bar to interstate agreements
to engage in voting blocs and the like, see infra note 113.
113The obvious problem is that states are likely to engage in bloc voting in order to
gain voting power at the expense of other (nonaligned) states. One way around this
constitutional problem would be for state governments to stay out of the way in favor
of allowing organized groups of citizens within each state, or elected representatives
themselves, to fashion agreements. Another possibility is for a group of states to take
advantage of the Court's history of asking only whether an interstate agreement
unsubtly seeks to appropriate federal power to a set of states, see supra note 112, by
coordinating their incentives to legislators in the name of "regional economic
development." The larger issue is that the Court needs a better theory of the
Compact Clause in order to evaluate its impact on interstate precommitment politics.
114See supra notes 14 (bribery and illegal gratuity) and 39 (supplemental income).
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III. CONCLUSION

The case against precommitment politics is itself about
precommitment. It is arguable that the Constitution, or even

perhaps the common law and constitutional law of democracy
everywhere, precommits to a political world with no remedy for
breach of "contract" other than reputational losses for the
promisor and the possibility of voter disapproval in future

elections. There are small pieces of textual evidence in favor of
this view of American law, including the absence of any

constitutional provision for the popular recall of elected officials,
the Speech or Debate Clause, and the Compact Clause, but
these elements can also be used to argue the opposite case.115
I'5 Consider also the history of the Electoral College. States can allow political
parties to require presidential electors to pledge to vote for their political party's
nominated candidate. See Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 227-31 (1952) (holding that
Alabama could exclude a Democratic Party elector who refused to pledge support for
the Democratic Party's candidate). Nevertheless, an elector cannot legally be
prevented from casting her vote for whomever she pleases, thus betraying the voters'
trust and her own pledge. See Congressional Quarterly, Guide to U.S. Elections 207
(1975). But when all is said and done the evolution of the Electoral College has
plainly been toward the mandate model. See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 36
(1892) (noting that the original expectation of independent electors has been
frustrated). A Burkean institution has become mandate-driven-with hardly any
objection from courts.
Moreover, within the procedural context of the Electoral College, it is noteworthy
that although there had been a choice among three methods of choosing electors,
"voting within the state legislature, statewide unit voting, or district voting," Michael
J. O'Sullivan, Note, Artificial Unit Voting and the Electoral College, 65 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 2421, 2425 (1992), states quickly competed with one another until all came to use
the unit (or winner-take-all) method of voting. Id. at 2427. The Founders recognized
this contest for what it was-a precommitment strategy designed to maximize the
electoral votes of each individual state. For example, Thomas Jefferson wrote to
James Monroe on the Electoral College vote:
On the subject of an election by a general ticket, or by districts, most persons
here seem to have made up their minds. All agree that an election by districts
would be best, if it could be general; but while ten States choose either by their
legislatures or by a general ticket [precommitting to vote as a unit], it is folly
and worse than folly for the other six not to do it. In these ten States the
minority is certainly unrepresented; and their majorities not only have the
weight of their whole State in their scale, but have the benefit of so much of our
minorities as can succeed at a district election.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Colonel James Monroe (Jan. 12, 1800), in 10 The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson 134 (1907). In similar fashion, James Madison wrote to
George Hay:
I agree entirely with you in thinking that the election of presidential electors by
districts is an amendment very proper to be brought forward ....
The district
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If there is room to view the Constitution (or other blueprints
for democracy) as something less than inalterably opposed to
precommitment politics of all kinds, then there are both
normative and positive cases to be made about precommitments.
The central normative claim builds on the idea that since
contractual precommitments by informed and well-endowed
parties are generally thought to be fair and efficient, it is likely
that there are similar gains from trade in the political arena.
The argument is strengthened by the perception that organized
interest groups have substantial power in our political system,
that this power may sometimes reflect market and political
failures, and that legal constraints on (majoritarian) campaign
finance reform-combined with the financial investments
necessary for many political election campaigns-further
empower organized interests. It is plausible that dispersed
interests would benefit in relative terms from the introduction of
enforceable political precommitments. The logic of collective
action may also suggest the wisdom of a generous interpretation
of legal doctrines in favor of precommitment strategies that
bond otherwise unorganized but like-minded voters. Of course,
if political precommitments will either be generally enforced or
not enforced, then the normative argument for enforcement
must rest on the perception that organized interest groups are
already powerful and often undesirable, so that there is more to
gain than to lose from additional political contracts. In any
event, there is an especially strong argument for permitting
representatives to bind themselves to their constituents in a
flexible manner." 6
mode was mostly, if not exclusively, in view when the Constitution was framed
and adopted; and was exchanged for the general ticket and the legislative
election [in which the whole state precommits to vote as a unit] as the only
expedient for baffling the policy of the particular States which had set the
example.
Letter from James Madison to George Hay (Aug. 23, 1823), in 3 Letters and Other
Writings of James Madison 332, 333-34 (1867). Thus, states perceived that their likeminded citizens would gain power compared with citizens of other states if their
delegations were selected through a winner-takes-all procedure. Put differently,
precommitment politics flourished in at least one setting.
116 Again, the binding material would consist of financial incentives, much as
contracting parties are encouraged to "bind" themselves to one another by the
remedies available in contract law.
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The positive perspective on precommitment politics centers on

its puzzling absence in most settings. There are precommitment
arrangements in some deliberative bodies, 117 but no real
examples of aspiring representatives testing the legal limits of
precommitment to the voters they court. 118 The absence of

precommitments by representatives to their constituents may be
best explained by a circular problem involving credibility.
Voters would not believe precommitments of the kind advanced

in Part I of this Article because courts have never enforced such
117 On precommitments among members of the United Nations, see supra note 104.
In American politics, the most interesting examples involve party discipline. During
the Progressive Era, the Democratic Caucus controlled the voting behavior of
representatives in rather notorious fashion. See H.R. Doc. No. 324, supra note 106,
at 122-23. In 1915, Rule 7 of the Democratic Caucus stated as follows:
In deciding upon action in the house involving party policy or principle, a twothirds vote of those present and voting at a caucus meeting shall bind all
members of the caucus; provided, the said two-thirds vote is a majority of the
full Democratic membership of the house, and provided further, that no
member shall be bound upon questions involving a construction of the
Constitution of the United States or upon which he made contrary pledges to
his constituents prior to his election or received contrary instructions by
resolutions or platform from his nominating authority.
Wilder H. Haines, The Congressional Caucus of Today, 9 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 696, 69697 (1915).
The passage of the Seventeenth Amendment, which provided for the popular
election of senators, was a successful example of utilizing precommitment politics to
overcome entrenched institutional opposition to direct democracy. The "Oregon
System"--the populist-inspired reform of Oregon state government which became the
symbol of direct democracy during the Progressive Era leading to the adoption of the
Seventeenth Amendment-required candidates for the state legislature to sign one of
two statements: in the first the candidate pledged to vote for the popularly nominated
United States Senate candidate, and in the second the candidate pledged to use his
own judgment in choosing senators. See Kobach, supra note 54, at 1978. It is not
surprising that most candidates for popular election endorsed the former pledge, and
voted accordingly in elections for United States senators. Id. Although these pledges
were probably unenforceable as contracts, they successfully transformed the elections
of Oregon's United States senators in the state legislative assembly from a trustee to
a mandate model. See generally Schuman, supra note 9 (recounting the history and
origins of the "Oregon System"). A similar phenomenon occurred with electors to the
presidential college. See supra note 115; see also supra notes 22-28 and accompanying
text (proposing congressional precommitments regarding recommendations from
commissions).
118Put differently, there is no shortage of explanations for courts' refusing to make
political promises enforceable, but courts have not been put to the test by aspiring
political candidates. I have of course tried to suggest that most of the objections to
judicial enforcement, including administrative problems and various constitutional
hints, are in fact surmountable.
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contracts. If so, the system awaits some enterprising politician
who precommits as described, has some luck with the electorate,
and then perhaps regrets his promises (and tests the
enforceability of the earlier precommitment in the courts).
Judicial sympathy for the disappointed voters (and for other
aspiring politicians)-or, as I have suggested, perhaps hostility
to interest groups-might then create a precedent which
facilitates precommitment politics. The attention paid to the
Contract with America, and to specific precommitment attempts
regarding terms of office and balanced budgets, may induce
enterprising politicians down this path. The positive, normative,
and doctrinal questions raised here may then be upon us.
Another solution to the positive puzzle of the absence of
innovative precommitments is that aspiring politicians may
understand that voters are not really as disgusted with broken
promises, interest groups, and professional representatives as it
sometimes appears.11 9 If--contrary to my own intuitions-few
voters (and readers) would wish for their representatives to
precommit to a mandate model, and if voters value political
flexibility enough to tolerate broken (specific, substantive)
promises, and if most voters would not wish to be able to
precommit along with selected other voters to bloc voting, then
perhaps it is time we realize that the literature on rent seeking,
agency costs, interest groups, and campaign finance is at odds
with what most voters (and even most academic readers) really
think about the health of our system of political representation.
If, on the other hand, serious citizens regard the political system
as in need of repair, then it is time to tolerate and even
encourage experiments of the kind explored in this Article.

119Alternatively, perhaps no aspiring politician has yet thought of the contract
analogy and of the idea of an enforceable precommitment to reflect voter preferences
as revealed, for example, by a carefully chosen and insulated survey group.
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